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PROLOGUE 
A war was fought between Argentina and England in the 
early 1980's over a thinly populated South Atlantic archipelago 
strategically located 500 kilometers east of the Magellan strait. 
Any discussion about the conflict seemed to land one in the un-
comfortable position of an immediate value judgment, since one 
had to choose to speak either of the Malvinas, or of the 
Falklands, or else employ a clumsy circumlocution such as the 
one we have fabricated. 
Something similar occurs in discussions regarding 
«transcendental Thomism». It is liable to be objected that the 
phrase is either redundant and tautological (since Thomism can ac-
count for the various modes of human transcendence without a 
gratuitous adjective in front of it), or a contradiction (since St. 
Thomas in fact did not ground his philosophy by seeking the a-
priori elements that would make possible the construction of an 
object of knowledge.) 
Begging the indulgence of the reader, we note that 
transcendental Thomism is generally considered not as a historical 
exegesis of Thomist texts, but rather as one possible development 
of Thomist speculation after its encounter with centuries of scien-
tific progress and increased attention to the existential facet of 
philosophy. 
Our use of the phrase, then, is neither approbatory nor pe-
jorative. It is simply the least awkward manner of unequivocally 
referring to a series of influential thinkers of this century, who, 
inspired by St. Thomas, have applied themselves to the task of 
providing his world view with a critical foundation and method. 
This label is applied to authors divergent among themselves 
as to its exact meaning, but it is fair to say that in most cases, 
it involves the commencement of foundational method in the per-
formance of the knowing subject, the capturing of a content (con-
ditions of possiblity or structure of the subject) by reflection on 
the performance, and continuation of method an ongoing dialec-
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tic between further performances and further conceptualizations of 
the content of the subject. 
Thus transcendental Thomism relies on a fundamental 
foreknowledge within the performance of the knowing subject 
that is apt for thematization by reflective penetration. This 
foreknowledge must be seen as a notion of being that opens the 
horizon of being in which knowing qua knowing occurs and of-
fers us access to particular knowledge of beings: otherwise 
metaphysics as a science would not be possible in a transcendental 
context. 
Perchance, then, our thesis is centered upon such an in-
dispensable point as the notion of being in transcendental 
Thomism? Alas, no. For the most part, this discussion lies beyond 
the scope of the investigation undertaken. Although we had 
originally entertained such a resolve, it quickly became apparent 
that the extension of the project far exceeded the possibilities of 
a single thesis. In our opinion, such a project demands an intimate 
knowledge of classical transcendentalist postures and the analysis 
that the transcendental Thomists make of their failure, as well as 
a treatment of how non-transcendental Thomists explain the 
noetic status of our primordial and progressive knowledge of be-
ing, 1 not to mention a familiarity with the works of the most 
prominent transcendental Thomists and the ability to navigate 
comfortably between their peculiar terminologies. 
We have not abandoned such a quest entirely, however. Our 
thesis should be understood as a small contribution to this pro-
ject. We chose one transcendental Thomist in order to bring to 
light his approach to the subject, as a preparation for an later 
evaluation of his ideas about being and metaphysical method. This 
author is Bernard J. F. Lonergan, S. /., one of the more renowned 
contemporary neo-Thomist philosophers. A brief survey of 
Lonergan's life and publishing career will serve to situate the sub-
ject as a theme in the chronological development of his works. 
Through his doctoral investigations he became interested in 
problems of the interpretation of Thomistic texts as well as the 
chronological development of Aquinas' thought. These interests 
bore fruit in the articles later collected in the book Verbum 2. 
Lonergan felt that Aquinas' explanation of the doctrine of the 
Trinity was rarely grasped due to a deficient understanding of the 
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procession of interior words and love in the human mind, analogs 
used by Thomas to elucidate the processions of the Son and the 
Holy Spirit in the Trinity. His remedy consists in a dense, 
meticulous, and polemical treatise on mental operations that 
underlie Thomistic gnoseology. 
Lonergan's most renowned work, Insight, 3 was completed 
at the the beginning of his tenure as professor at the Gregorian 
University in 1953, although it was only published several years 
later. In contrast to the heavy emphasis on historical textual 
criticism and scholastic Latin expressions found in Verhum, 
Lonergan builds his cognitional theory in Insight by drawing on 
examples of insights as they occur to men in the fields of science, 
mathematics, the common-sense task of getting-by in life. 
The cognitional theory arrived at by the two routes is seen 
to be identical, however, when Lonergan switches from observa-
tion of insight in action to a properly theoretical account. The 
middle chapters of the book present a Thomist cognitional theory 
as the structured development of a natural «pure desire to know», 
and relate this dynamic principle to being and objectivity. 
In the latter chapters, Lonergan formulates a «position» on 
the basis of a dynamically structured subject and his notions of 
being and objectivity. This position is then shown to ground a 
metaphysics, a theory of interpretation, and an ethics. Finally, the 
reflection upon the dynamism that structures the subject leads to 
a global natural theology in which the five ways of St. Thomas 
are situated as specific examples of the demand for intelligibility 
that grounds our natural knowledge of God. 
The content of Insight was presented through a more 
scholastic lens during a series of lectures titled Understanding and 
Being, given by Lonergan several years after its publication. 4 The 
presentation is informal, more emphasis is placed on self-
appropriation, and comparisons with scholastic and modern 
authors are scattered throughout the presentation. 
In the synthetic Method in Theology 5 Lonergan set out to 
provide a method suitable for a fully critical theology. The 
general tendency has been to emphasize the continuity between 
the transcendental method of Insight and the method of theology 
proposed by Lonergan. 6 Even commentators who emphasize the 
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differences between the two books refer to Method in Theology as 
an expansion of theme that does not affect the basic cognitional 
structure and metaphysics proposed in Insight, which will be the 
focus of our study. 7 
Many of the numerous papers and lectures of Lonergan have 
been periodically compiled into books by his followers, resulting 
in Collection,* A Second Collection,* and A Third Collection. 10 
The subject matter of the Collection treats the same topics found 
in Insight and Verbum. The essays in Second Collection take on an 
increasingly existential tone, with an emphasis on the importance 
of meaning and historicity in the study of man. In Third Collec-
tion Lonergan veers away from basic questions of cognitional 
theory and metaphysics towards matters of praxis and social-
economic theory. However, the changes are a deepening and ex-
tension of the metaphysical and epistemological doctrines and not 
a radical reversal that would affect our study. 1 1 
In the present study we shall draw most heavily on Insight. 
We shall interpret it in light of Verbum and Understanding and 
Being. When doctrines of Insight are explained more succinctly 
Method in Theology or one of Lonergan's essays, we shall have 
recourse to those sources. 
The present study intensifies, if anything, the focus on the 
subject that characterized the thesis from which it is excerpted. 
We have omitted the evolution of Lonergan's transcendental 
stance in his monographic articles about St. Thomas (Sec. I.I.B), 
as well as clarifying comparisons with Kant (I.II.B.1), Marechal 
(I.II.B.2), and Rahner (II.I.C.4-6). We have prescinded completely 
from our personal interpretation of Insight and its relation to Ver-
bum (II.V.A and B). We have substantially reduced the treatment 
of the subject 's expansion into metaphysics (Sec. II.V.C, D, and 
E) and inserted it into a general overview of Lonergan's basic 
position. Most significantly, we have laid aside almost entirely the 
details of the operation of the subject on the respective levels of 
experience, understanding, and judgment (Chapters II.II, II.III, and 
II.IV), hoping that the nature of the subject as a whole may shine 
forth by curtailing the detailed discussion of its parts. 
I take this occasion to thank D. Juan Jose Sanguined for his 
diligent direction of the elaboration of the thesis, as well as the 
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helpful observations offered by D. Mariano Artigas, D. Modesto 
Santos, D. José Angel Garcia, and D. Antonio Carol on the occa-
sion of its presentation. I am also grateful for the technical 
assistance of many others who made this work possible, among 
them Frank Aniban, Frank Hoffman, and Gregorio Garcia. 
NOTES PROLOGUE 
1. It seems that such an explanation is still on the way to a stable configura-
tion. For example, Luis Romera notes that Fabro only refers marginally to 
the theme of the primum cognitum, and does not systematically treat its 
noetic status. Romera offers an analysis of the question in a dissertation 
presented only last year. See Excerpta e Dissertationibus in Philosophia, 
Facultad Eclesiástica de Filosofía, Universidad de Navarra, 1990, pp. 223, 
241. Also, Orestes González notes that Gilson and Fabro dedicate only 
scarce commentaries regarding the intellection of the act of being: «En la 
linea de pensamiento tomista abierta por estos autores no se encuentra tam-
poco una aproximación convincente que dilucide la operación intelectual 
por la que se aprehende el acto de ser...» («Tomas de Aquino: La aprehen-
sión del Acto de Ser», Antiario Filosófico, 22, 1989, p. 147.) 
2. This series of five articles published between 1946 and 1949 in Theological 
Studies was subsequently collected and published under one cover as 
Lonergan's Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas, (Notre Dame, University 
of Notre Dame Press, 1967), ed. David Burrell. Our citations of this work 
shall be to the book Verbum and not the articles. 
3. Lonergan, Insight: A Study of Human Understanding, London; Dartman, 
Longman & Todd; 2nd ed. 1958. 
4. These have been compiled in Understanding and Being, ed. Mark D. & 
Elizabeth A. Morelli, (Lewiston, New York: Edwin Mellen Press, 1980). 
5. Lonergan, Method in Theology (New York: Herder and Herder, 1972). 
6. See Hugo Meynell, «On Objections to Lonergan's 'Method'», The Heythrop 
Journal 19 (1978) 405-410. 
7. See pp. 409-412 of Carol Skrenes's «Lonergan's Metaphysics: Ontological 
Implications of Insight-as-Event», International Philosophical Quarterly 24 
(1984) 407-425. 
8. Collection. Papers by Bernard Lonergan, S.J.., F. E. Crowe, ed., (New York: 
Herder and Herder, 1968). 
9. A Second Collection. Papers., ed. W. Ryan and B. Tyrell, (London: Darton, 
Longman, and Todd, 1974). 
10. A Third Collection. Papers., ed. F. Crowe, (Mahwah, N J : Paulist Press, 
1985). 
11 . In the reminiscence of the article «Insight Revisited*, (see Second Collection, 
pp. 275 f.) Lonergan makes it plain that he has not altered any cognitional 
or epistemological views; although he does concern himself with com-
pleting the grounding of ethics begun in Insight. 
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THE SUBJECT IN THE 
TRANSCENDENTAL METHOD 
OF BERNARD LONERGAN 
I. THE SUBJECT IN METHOD 
A. The Significance of Method 
Lonergan has been credited with the gradual formulation of 
a method of methods-zn empirically-controlled, personally verifiable 
analysis of conscious subjectivity. This analysis, starting from a 
consideration of the subject's intentionality, elaborates our cogni-
tional structure, whose exigencies in turn dictate the method of 
metaphysics, integrate the methods of the natural sciences, and 
provide the formal anthropological component of the methods of 
the human sciences and theology. 
If Lonergan is a fan of speculative knowledge for its own 
sake even to the extent of grounding a metaphysics on the 
dynamics of its attainment, he is also cognizant of the conse-
quences of its deployment. Let us then sample instances from his 
works in which his dense and technical discussions briefly yield to 
passionate asides that reveal his campaign against the flight from 
understanding. 
The flight from understanding generates the debilitating 
biases of individual egoists and collective intersubjective groups 
(clans, tribes, classes, political and professional organizations, na-
tions, etc.) Most pernicious of all is the general bias inherent in 
common sense: «the peculiar danger...to extend its legitimate con-
cern for the concrete and the immediately practical into disregard 
of larger issues and indifference to long-term results.* 1 
The significance of method in arresting cultural decline is to 
explicitate the bases on which common sense can be judged, for 
despite its profound sanity with regard to the particular it is utter-
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ly incapable of criticizing itself. Only a mind attuned to method 
can detect its own bias when that bias is supported by the texture 
of an entire civilization: 
Opinions and attitudes that once were the oddity of a 
minority gradually spread through society to become the 
platitudes of politicians and journalists, the assumptions of 
legislators and educators, the uncontroverted nucleus of 
the common sense of a people. 2 
Thus on the level of culture and socio-economic praxis, it is 
common sense that must be regulated by science. 
Science, however, could no more place an exclusive claim on 
knowledge than common sense could. Now that the development 
of science itself has cut the umbilical cord of imaginable scientific 
entities of mechanist determinism, and the imaginable space and 
time in which they were supposed to move, the need to 
distinguish between scientific positions and their extra-scientific 
trappings is more keenly felt: 
Instead of waiting for the scientists to bring about the 
elimination of the mistaken philosophic assumption of 
mechanist determinism... metaphysics undertakes the 
transformation. Insofar as there is operat ive. . .a 
metaphysics as we are attempting to conceive it, one has 
a principle that will transform the counter-positions in 
contemporary science. 3 
Another implication of transcendental method for the 
sciences is the possibility for scientific collaboration. As the com-
plexities of individual departments of knowledge expand, the 
tendency to know more and more about less and less sets in: «Self 
appropriation can be hindered by total absorption in the object, 
as in the specialized sciences.*4 The scourge of isolated sciences 
and scarcity of interdisciplinary investigators is well-known; 
Lonergan draws a conclusion regarding method: 
It is in the measure that special methods acknowledge 
their common core in transcendental method, that norms 
common to all the sciences will be acknowledged, that a 
secure basis will be attained for attacking interdisciplinary 
problems, and that the sciences will be mobilized within 
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a higher unity...in which they will be able to make 
their...contribution to the solution of fundamental pro-
blems. 5 
Turning to phi losophy proper, the significance of 
transcendental method can perhaps best be cast in the context of 
the historical dialectic of the demand for method in metaphysics. 
This demand arose from the apparently insoluble problem of 
distinguishing between divine grace and human freedom given the 
impossiblility of conceiving one term without the other. The 
technical distinction (most completely formulated by Aquinas) of 
reason and faith in two entitative orders, one natural and the 
other supervening gratuitously, has withstood a barrage constant 
attacks throughout seven centuries. It has only grown in impor-
tance within Catholic theology. 
Although this medieval achievement is a distinction within 
theology, its significance extends further: 
...once reason is acknowledged to be distinct from faith, 
there is issued an invitation to reason to grow in con-
sciousness of its native power, to claim its proper field of 
inquiry, to work out its departments of investigation, to 
determine its own methods, to operate on the basis of its 
own principles and precepts. 6 
In Descartes, the methodological exigence proper to 
phi losophy was expl ic i t ly envisaged and amply explored. 
However, his legitimate pursuit of philosophical method apart 
from a religious thematization was not accompanied by a similar 
appreciation of the relative independence of science from 
philosophy: 
As he deduced the existence of God from the initial cer-
titude of the Cogito, he also deduced the conservation of 
momentum from the immutability of God. Clearly the 
distinction between reason and faith had to be followed 
by a distinction between science and philosophy... as 
theology had been able to work out its method only by 
dist inguishing itself from phi losophy and thereby 
generating a challenge to its pre-eminence, so philosophy 
could not formulate its nature and method without 
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distinguishing itself from science and thereby calling forth 
a challenge to its ambition to rule . 7 
If the examples that confront us today are less ingenuous 
than the anterior Cartesian discussions, or the Galilean controver-
sy over primary and secondary qualities, their significance for 
method is no less pressing. Lonergan's point is that a generalized 
method must go beyond simply sifting scientific discoveries from 
their extra-scientific accretions-it can also lend a structure to 
scientific investigation without infringing on its proper autonomy. 
The autonomy of the sciences called for a serious updating 
of Aristotelian-Thomist philosophy. This is due firstly to the sim-
ple fact of the accelerated progress of the sciences.8 More impor-
tant perhaps are the implications of the autonomy of the sciences 
for the very ideal of science itself. For Aristotle, the sciences were 
not autonomous disciplines, but rather formed a single grouping 
with philosophy. They differed from philosophy in the same way 
that they differed from one another, by their material and formal 
objects as descriptively conceived. 9 Aristotle also had a precise 
idea of science as knowledge of things through their causes, where 
a thing falls under the predicaments, and the causes are either the 
end, agent, matter, or form. Analysis discovered causes and syn-
thesis moved back from causes to things. 1 0 
In Lonergan's view, this has all changed. Things and causes 
have vanished from science, leaving the analysis of data and syn-
thesis of laws, systems, states, and probabilities. 1 1 The current 
constitution of the distinct sciences not a result of objects but 
rather of of fields and methods. 1 2 Generalized method then, 
must pull traditional scholastic metaphysics out of the compromis-
ing orbit of the Aristotelian science and endow it with new life 
and vigor through a grounding in cognitional theory. 
Continuing with the dialectic of demand for method, it 
becomes clear that the revamping of Thomist speculation to ac-
count for scientific progress was generally ignored in favor of the 
development of the ideal of pure reason. Foreshadowed by late 
scholasticism, initiated by Descartes, and amplified by Spinoza, 
Leibniz and Wolff, the mathematical ideal engulfed philosophy 
like a cancerous growth. A set of fundamental, analytic self-
evident propositions valid in every possible world allowed the 
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deduction by the pure reason of of equally necessary and universal 
conclusions. The rigor of this method was purchased at a price of 
the inability to deal with the concrete. 
The Kantian criticism of this ideal substituted an exquisitely 
crafted concrete deductive method for the abstract ideal of the 
pure reason. 1 3 Philosophy cannot represent its concepts in pure 
a-priori intuitions the way (Kant thought) that mathematics can, 
thus it cannot follow the method of pure reason. It does have a 
supporting role, for Kant in providing the limiting concepts that 
regulate the functioning of the spontaneous intellect, whose 
necessity grounds the possibility of science. 
A more radical challenge to the demand for method was ad-
duced by Hegel. The pursuit of knowledge is the pursuit of 
something that is not yet known, and to account for that one 
must have some sort of ideal. Any conceptual formulation of this 
ideal is necessarily incomplete and inadequate, and thus abstract. 
It cannot fully represent what is being expressed. Its very abstrac-
tion, however, will eventually reveal with ever increasing clarity 
an alienation or tension between the subject and the ideal. This 
easily fits in the recurring Hegelian scheme of thesis (ideal of 
philosophy or science), antithesis (abstraction or alienation), and 
reconciliation (new ideal). 
A generalized method cannot ignore the Hegelian challenge, 
thinks Lonergan, since there is no use in trying to pretend that 
the ideal of knowledge will not inevitably contain some element 
of abstraction. Nonetheless, there is an alternative: 
...insofar as one moves towards what has to present for 
other things to be present to it, one is dealing with what 
conceptually is implicit still, but is de facto my empirical, 
intelligent, rational consciousness. It is functionally 
operative in my knowing. There is an escape from the 
abstraction insofar as I turn to the sources that are func-
tionally operative in my inquiries, my investigations, my 
attempts to formulate. 1 4 
The historical dynamic of the demand for method, however, 
did not cease with Kantian critique and Hegelian dialectic. The 
dominant features of Lonergan's cultural matrix were scientific 
positivism and spreading Marxist utopianism: 
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As there is a post-Cartesian affirmation of philosophy 
that rules theology out of court, so there is a post-
Kantian affirmation of science that tosses overboard even 
Kant's modest claims for philosophy, and there is a still 
later totalitarian violence that with equal impartiality 
brushes aside theology and philosophy and science. 1 5 
The significance that positivist, pragmatic, anti-metaphysical 
thinking holds for method is the blank it creates in the mind of 
man regarding all that cannot be directly experienced sensibly. 
Lonergan uses the comparison of primitive tribes who are as in-
telligent and rational as anyone regarding the practical affairs of 
everyday life, but who surround elements that are beyond their 
control with an enormous structure of myth and magic. 
Positivism, Lonergan charges, is a reduction of knowledge to the 
development of the intell igent and rational component of 
primitive living, while neglecting to replace its myth and magic 
with anything more than a vacuum: 
He [the positivist] knows nothing about these things; he 
is an agnostic, and for a great part of his life he does not 
worry about it. But, while the...scientist or mathematician 
does not suffer too much from that blank the general 
population does suffer... If a vacuum exists in the popular 
mind, a terrific, irrational national convulsion can result. 
This is one of the main problems of our time. We cannot 
be content merely to make more cultivated and more 
civilized the intelligent and rational part [of primitive liv-
ing]... while maintaining a surrounding no-man's land 
which used to be inhabited by myth and magic but 
which is now empty. We cannot refuse to admit, here lie 
strange beasts, and simply not bother about it. The real 
problem of human development is the problem of occu-
pying this territory, this blank, with intelligence and 
reasonableness, just as we have occupied the territory that 
can be controlled by sensible consequences. 1 6 
Let us now turn to the significance of method for theology, 
first in its relations with other sciences and then in itself. We 
have already spoken of the integrating role with regard to the 
sciences that method must create for metaphysics. However, 
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Lonergan notes, the human sciences insofar as they deal with man 
in this concrete world are not capable of complete subsumption 
under a merely philosophical viewpoint: 
Insofar as man in this world suffers from original sin and 
receives God's grace or refuses it, there are fundamental 
truths about man that cannot be subsumed under a 
philosophy considered as knowledge natural to man, 
knowledge attained by reason. Those truths have to be 
subsumed under a theology. 1 7 
This integration is of utmost importance to the human 
sciences themselves, to theology, and to the unity of life of the 
Catholic scientist. If the human sciences themselves are not in-
tegrated by method within a philosophy and a theology, they 
tend to imitate the methods of the natural empirical sciences: 
Many human scientists are trying to ride the bandwagon 
of the physicists and chemists, and a science of man is 
pursued as though man were just another electron or 
another atom. As long as human science is of that 
type...we shall have creeping socialism. 1 8 
Lonergan's point would seem to be that human scientists 
must aim at suggesting to free people what free people can do for 
themselves, if they are not to degenerate into mere consultants to 
centralized governments that must claim ever greater powers to 
carry out the advice of its specialists. 1 9 
Next, the integration to which we have referred will affect 
theology itself, since the human sciences lend it an ever greater 
supporting structure. Anthropology , l inguist ics , history of 
literature (e.g. literary history of the Bible), patristic and conciliar 
history, etc., enter into theology, and cannot be integrated unless 
some overarching synthesis is found. 
The integration of natural sciences within a philosophy and 
of philosophy and human sciences within a theology, is also an 
existential need of Catholic scientists: 
...we go to great expense to have Catholic universities; 
yet , our professors cannot be anything more than 
specialists in physics, specialists in chemistry, specialists in 
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biology, specialists in history. If they can search and 
search for philosophic and theological aids to give them 
the orientation that would be specifically Catholic in 
their fields and still not find them, because neither 
philosophy nor theology are doing their job of in-
tegrating, then we have a problem. 2 0 
Lonergan has much more to say about the significance of 
method for theology than can be detailed in this summary. His 
general concern is to ground and control the use of the human 
sciences in theology, and pave the way for a mutual collaboration 
between theologians of different specializations. 2 1 He achieves this 
by patterning both an analytic (or mediating) group and a syn-
thetic (or mediated) group of functional specialties upon the levels 
of existential subjectivity. However, at the moment we can con-
tent ourselves with simply noting the importance of method for 
apologetics: 
If one is not to affirm reason at the expense of faith or 
faith at the expense of reason one is called upon to pro-
duce a synthesis that unites two orders of truth and to 
give evidence of a successful symbiosis of two principles 
of knowledge. 2 2 
No strange desire, this-the search for such compatibility 
dates to the earliest years of Christianity, and measured the minds 
of the best thinkers of the Middle Ages. Nonetheless, the urgency 
for this synthesis on the heels of four centuries of unprecedented 
scientific discovery is greater, not less: 
...if Catholics have endeavoured to establish the synthesis 
of the objects, and the symbiosis of the principles of 
reason and faith, it is also true that their efforts have 
been constantly embarrassed by the instability of the pro-
nouncements of scientific reason... 2 3 
Regardless of whether the issue at any one time was physics, 
Semitic literature, biology, or depth psychology, 
...the initiative seemed permanently in the hands of those 
who invoked science against religion... the defenders were 
left in the unenviable position of always arriving on the 
scene a little breathlessly and a little late. 2 4 
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Lonergan spies a solution to this unfortunate state of affairs. 
A sufficiently flexible and detailed cognitional theory could allow 
complete deference to the positive element of rationalism, yet 
reverse the opposition it manufactures between the exigencies of 
the intelligence and the claims of religion. 
Let us summarize. The significance of a generalized method 
is that of issuing basic precepts to all categorical methods, critical-
ly grounding them in matters of verifiable psychological fact, 
dialectically judging praxis as well as theory, and systematizing all 
theory by providing paradigmatic terms and relations. Such a 
method will explicitate the intentionality proper to man in 
myriad forms, foment interdisciplinary cooperation, and provide 
continuity between various theoretical methods that nonetheless 
does not violate their autonomy. Such a method performs these 
functions for metaphysics, for interpretation, ethics, and opens the 
horizon of the «transcendental» in the strict sense, i.e. the super-
natural. 2 5 Such a method must respond to Descartes' aspiration 
for bold methodical initiative, must meet the demands upon 
future metaphysics that Kant formulated but could not fulfill, 
must overcome the Hegelian objection to abstract ideals of 
knowledge. 2 6 But what, we may ask, does all this have to do 
with Thomism? 
B. Thomism of Yesterday and Tomorrow--The Significance of Subject 
in Method 
Lonergan obviously feels that this transcendental turn will 
render the genius of St. Thomas available to modern man, will 
point the way out of the modern philosophical dispersion, and 
will enable a unification of all the fields of theoretical knowledge 
in an interior (or methodological or critical) differentiation of con-
sciousness, just as in times past the theoretical differentiation of 
consciousness uplifted and purified the consciousness of ordinary 
experience. 
Before any of this can be accomplished, a prior critique of 
the subject (or subjective pole of the total and basic horizon 
which is metaphysics) is necessary in order to thematize its 
method of performing and reveal its true and proper stature. 2 7 
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It is this prior critique of the incarnate inquirer that will concern 
us in the present work. 
Metaphysics (and by implication its extensions into inter-
pretation, ethics, natural theology) needs this cognitional theory as 
a transcendental grounding, without which they become bogged 
down in a pre-critical morass. 2 8 But cognitional theory can have 
its own morass as well. Starting with Descartes, a series of 
philosophers have questioned whether our knowledge really 
knows what it assumes it knows. The myriad forms of modern 
philosophy have not slackened in their critical exigence. Among 
the diverse postures of skepticism, transcendentalism, idealism, col-
lective or individual linguistic transcendentalism, phenomenology 
one of the few constants has been the concern to justify the reach 
and sufficiency of man's knowledge. 
Undoubtedly the critical problem admits of numerous 
sophistical formulations. Moreover, the lesson of history of 
philosophy seems to show that it channels speculation pell-mell 
towards ever greater sterility if exalted as the philosophical pro-
blem. But is the critical exigence radically deceptive, utter 
nonsense? Perhaps neo-Thomists have tended to reply in the affir-
mative. The critical problem is a false problem; skepticism is 
wrong and can be countered by a reductio ad ahsurdem. The pro-
per approach to the question of the aptness of our knowing 
faculties is to take it for granted at the start of philosophizing and 
support the assumption by later analysis of knowledge and 
knowing. 
Other followers of St. Thomas have gradually carved out 
more refined procedures that in a certain way bestow a primacy 
upon an analysis of knowing. Cornelio Fabro, for instance, has 
suggested that a phenomenology of perception must precede 
metaphysics to deal with being in the concrete before metaphysics 
deals with it in the abstract. The immediate presence of the world 
is made known to us in perception; thus an enumeration of the 
levels of perception and an explanation of their interaction pro-
vide access to metaphysics and its basic terms (subject, object, 
causality, substance, existence). 2 9 
Lonergan has extended this phenomenological propedeutic of 
metaphysics beyond perception into a fully critical transcendental 
Thomism that demands a previous phenomenology of all our 
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knowing operations before metaphysics is undertaken. Rather than 
simply ask in the abstract if skepticism is wrong and knowing is 
possible for us, he wants to lay out in minute detail in what know-
ing consists, and why doing that is knowing, and only then ask 
if that knowing is possible. This involves a theory of the subject. 
Consistent with this outlook, metaphysics cannot begin until 
such acts as understanding, conceptualization, and judgment have 
been treated, since these are considered to contribute essentially to 
the basic terms of metaphysics. This extension and intensification 
transforms cognitional theory from a simple access to metaphysics 
into its generating principle and even structural model. 
Lonergan is fond of situating this novel approach within the 
Leonine program to «extend and perfect the old by the new.» 3 0 
The old, in his view, is clearly the genius of St. Thomas Aquinas in 
having carried forward the vast task of coherently organizing the da-
ta from Scripture and Tradition, integrating it with the products of 
Greek and Arabic culture (as exemplified by Aristotle's ontology and 
cosmology), distinguishing the natural from the supernatural, and 
achieving a partial but fruitful understanding of these supernatural 
beliefs on the basis of analogy with the naturally known. 3 1 
In what, then consists the «new»? One commentator, David 
Tracy, observes that in Insight Lonergan considers two post-
Medieval developments as absolutely determining-the scientific 
revolution of the last four centuries and the critical movement in 
philosophy. 3 2 The ambivalence of the fruits of these intellectual 
upheavals indicate the need for their integration with traditional 
wisdom; indeed their inability to unassistedly satisfy man's in-
tellectual and existential needs positively demands this integration. 
They can neither be naively embraced nor jettisoned outright. 
How, then, must these developments be taken into account in any 
attempt to renew Thomism and import its achievements to the 
contemporary quest for understanding and solution of the pro-
blems of our era? 
By transposing, answers Lonergan, «classical» Thomism into 
a «Thomism of tomorrow* in five principal areas to account for 
the change in cultural context between the 13th and 20th cen-
turies. 3 3 Briefly described, these transformations consist in 
1. the expansion of logic into a method capable of in-
cluding non-logical cognitional operations and a dialectic, 
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2. the replacement of the Aristotelian concept of science 
(i.e. certain knowledge of the necessary through 
causes) by a modern concept of science (probable 
knowledge of verifiable possibil it ies manifested 
through correlations), 
3 . the refocusing of attention away from the 
metaphysical notion of the soul and its properties and 
toward the self-appropriation of the subject, 
4. the recognition of meaning as constitutive of human 
living, and a consequent attention to human history 
(not only human nature) as an essential element in the 
understanding of man, 
5. the location of the foundations of thought in the 
structural invariants of the concrete human subject in-
stead of in abstract propositions of supposedly self-
evident first principles. 
Is it possible to perform these transpositions and still retain 
a Thomist world-view? Lonergan thinks that this can be 
demonstrated to a greater (transpositions 1, 2 , 3, and 5 ) or lesser 
(transposition 4) extent to someone willing to meditate on the cor-
pus Thomisticum in its entirety and its historical context. On the 
other hand, the so-called anthropological turn signified by the last 
three transpositions has been the source, in other authors, of a 
good deal of doctrinal ambiguity and forced interpretation of 
Thomist philosophy. 3 4 
The fifth transposition, to the transcendental method, is the 
most general; the other transpositions are implied in it; it is the 
remote concern of the present work. The third transposition, 
from the soul to the subject--the specific manifestation of 
transcendental method in the fields of metaphysics and cognitional 
theory, will be the proximate concern of the present work. 
In short, metaphysics is not a philosophic first for Lonergan. 
It is a «conclusion derived from epistemology and cognitional 
theory, and these in turn [are] formulations of one's personal ex-
perience of one's own cognitional operations.* 3 5 These so-called 
anthropological turns from metaphysics to transcendental method, 
or soul to subject, comprise a hermeneutic key to understanding 
Lonergan's three major works . 3 6 
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C. Meanings of «Transcendental» and «Criticism» 
1. A First Meaning 
The significance of the anthropological turn naturally affects 
the science of anthropology, allegedly providing it with a more 
reliable content and a surer method by shifting to a more accessi-
ble point of departure. In hylemorphic terms, the «surer method* 
could be considered the formal component and the «more reliable 
content* the material component. 
The anthropological turn, however, does not refer solely to 
a renewed interest in anthropology or a novel emphasis within it. 
The project of Lonergan reaches further than mere anthropology. 
The initial contention-that the formal component of anthropology 
derives not of the fact that man is being investigated, but on the 
fact that a human is performing the investigation-is the case in 
any science. Thus, not only in anthropology, but in any science 
concerned with whatever type of object, the formal component or 
method would depend principally on the formal component or 
method of how the human mind works. 
Two disjunctions can be made. First, this does not mean 
that there is a single method to which all disciplines wanting to 
be called sciences must follow, 3 7 but rather that there is a single 
basis for the methods of all the sciences, given that it is the 
human mind at work in all of them. 
Secondly, the commonly used phrase of ^anthropological 
turn» is not exactly precise, since, as we shall see, the method of 
methods is reached by the study of the subject, which is a sub-set 
of the study of man. The more precise term is «transcendental», 
here used in the Kantian sense of bringing to light the conditions 
of possibility of knowing an object as far as that knowledge is a-
priori. 
A number of modern followers of St. Thomas can be refer-
red to as «transcendental Thomists». 3 8 We shall mean by the 
term «transcendental Thomist» a professed follower of St. Thomas 
who thinks that the thought of the Angelic Doctor can respond, 
and should respond, to the Critical challenge issued by I. Kant to 
every future metaphysics, i.e. to first provide an enumeration and 
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analysis of the a-priori elements of the reason together with all 
that can be deduced from them. 3 9 
Although it would be simplistic to summarily dismiss this 
movement as «Kantian,» certainly its representatives share a com-
mon starting point in their philosophies of the knowing subject. 
In this sense, the objectification of conscious subjectivity is «first 
philosophy* for them, and the adjective transcendental is properly 
applied to their efforts. 
2. A Second Meaning 
In his explanations, Lonergan usually does not immediately 
proceed to explicate the functioning of the human mind in its 
conscious activity (the subject), since the subject, while revealed in 
this activity, is nonetheless present in an oblique fashion, secon-
dary to a primary presence of an intentional term or object. 
Therefore, it is more convenient to first observe the mind at 
work in a number of intellectual activities before proceeding to 
objectify the reality of the subject's functioning. 
This is exactly what Lonergan does in the first seven 
chapters of Insight, where he considers simple geometrical and 
algebraic examples, the elaboration of classical and statistical scien-
tific methods, general relativity theory, psychology, sociology, and 
common sense knowledge. Only afterward does he turn to the 
analysis of intentional and conscious subjectivity that forms the 
core of the book. 4 0 He follows a similar if drastically abbreviated 
procedure in his explication of the transcendental method in the 
first chapter of Method in Theology. Acknowledging that the 
method of natural sciences cannot be directly applied to theology, 
he first analyzes the scientific method to uncover the mind at 
work in it, next objectifies this functioning in the transcendental 
method, and finally considers the implications and exigences the 
transcendental method will have for theology. 4 1 
The conscious activities that pertain to a subject are found 
by Lonergan to relate to one another in a successive manner. 
Some activities presuppose others and go beyond them, in such a 
way that the conscious operations pertinent to the transcendental 
method can be metaphorically grouped in «levels» of subjectivity, 
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each containing various operations. Naming the levels by the most 
noteworthy operation or characteristic of each, Lonergan arrives 
at a fourfold structure comprised by the levels of presentations, 
understanding, reflection, and deliberation. 
The intentional subjectivity revealed on these levels occurs 
in the direct mode if the presentations are data, and in the in-
trospective mode if the presentations are conscious direct-mode 
acts of the subject himself. The gradual ascent of the subject in 
the introspective mode, as we shall see, is referred to by Loner-
gan as the taking possession of one's own subjectivity, or self-
appropriation. 
Each level of intentionality thus conceived is directed to a 
goal, called a transcendental. The intending of the level of the in-
telligence is directed toward the transcendental intelligibility, the 
intending of the level of reflection toward truth and reality, the 
intending of the level of deliberation, toward value or the good. 42 
Therefore, Lonergan's method can be called «transcendental» 
in a second sense. Since questions are potentially unlimited, so are 
the transcendentals. Since the intentions on each level are of an 
unknown whole, of which the answers reveal only a part, the 
transcendentals are comprehensive. Therefore, Lonergan's method 
is based on transcendentals in a sense analogous to the scholastic 
usage of the word, i.e. as that opposed to what is merely 
categorial. 4 3 
To sum up, the twice-transcendental method of Lonergan 
purports to adequately respond to the demands of Critical 
philosophy in a way that previous scholastic methods could not. 
Before examining Lonergan's transcendental subject and its role in 
metaphysics, then, it will be worthwhile to survey the meanings 
which he gives to the basic terms which undergird it, e.g., con-
sciousness, intentionality, cognitional structure, being and objectivity. 
II. BASIC IDEAS 
A rather long subsection about consciousness and inten-
tionality introduces this section, since precision in Lonergan's 
usage of these terms avoids subsequent misunderstandings. The 
structure of subjectivity is then briefly described and related to 
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consciousness. This allows at least a preliminary sketch of self-
appropriation, the self-proclaimed goal to which Lonergan wishes 
to lead the readers of Insight. In the spirit of St. Thomas, 4 4 we 
shall provide diagrams where useful to help sort out the various 
levels and modes of subjectivity of which Lonergan speaks. 
A. Consciousness and Intentionality 
We have mentioned previously that conscious operations 
provide the starting point for Lonergan's method. We will look 
a little more closely at his meaning of «conscious« and the related 
notion of «intentional» as applied to these operations. 
To which operations does Lonergan refer? When talking 
about the conscious operations that together comprise knowing, 
Lonergan lists them as seeing, hearing, smelling, touching, tasting, 
inquiring, imagining, understanding, conceiving, formulating, 
reflecting, marshalling and weighing the evidence, and judging. 4 5 
Since not all conscious operations are cognitional, when exposing 
the operations to be considered in a general transcendental 
method, he adds the operations of deliberating, evaluating, 
deciding, speaking, and writing. 4 6 
These operations are said to be intentional.. Intentionality is 
the psychological presence of an object in an operation: 
To say that the operations intend objects is to refer to 
such facts as that by seeing there becomes present what 
is seen, by hearing there becomes present what is heard, 
by imagining there becomes present what is imagined, 
and so on, where in each case the presence in question is 
a psychological event. 4 7 
Lonergan notes that, «the intrinsic objectivity of cognitional 
activity is its intentionality.* 4 8 The operator of these acts is 
precisely the subject that is under consideration in the present 
work. 
A diagram of the intentional act is shown in Fig. 1, with 
the arrow representing the operation, and the direction of arrow 
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showing that the operation, although of the subject, nonetheless 
consists in making the object present to the subject. 
subject object 
Figure 1: The intentional act 
The subject is «aware of himself operating, present to 
himself operating, experiencing himself operating.* 4 9 The self-
awareness of the subject is what is meant by consciousness. Thus 
follow the various descriptions of consciousness that Lonergan 
gives in his works: 
By consciousness we shall mean that there is an awareness 
immanent in cognitional acts. 5 0 
...empirical knowledge of our inner acts...empirical self-
knowledge... 5 1 
...I defined it [consciousness] as an internal experience, in 
the strict sense of that word, of the self and of its acts. 
I grant that all cognitive acts have terms, but I believe 
they also have principles, and...consciousness is of the 
principle not the term.. . 5 2 
...consciousness is a cognoscere sub ratione experti. 51 
What Lonergan is driving at here with his references to «ex-
perience» and «experti» is that consciousness is not an inward look 
by which a person intuits himself as an object. 
The psychological experience which is consciousness is a com-
panion and counterpoint to the intentionality of an operation: 
Just as operations by their intentionality make objects 
present to the subject, so also by their consciousness they 
make the operating subject present to himself.5 4 
Thus consciousness is not another operation, it is not the in-
trinsic aspect of an operation called intentionality; it is rather the 
intrinsic aspect by which the subject is aware of himself.5 5 
This presence of both object and subject in conscious acts 
has led some commentators to talk of Lonergan's theory of con-
scious intentionality or intentional consciousness. 56 Although the 
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expression is Lonergan's, 5 7 he himself does not often use this 
play of words, deliberately in our opinion, to avoid the danger of 
forgetting that the two presences in question are distinct. Certain-
ly without the conscious act there would be no object (and for 
Lonergan, no subject either). Certainly the subject and object are 
co-present, as well. Nonetheless, the presences are not of like kind 
simply because they are simultaneous, and Lonergan is careful to 
distinguish them. 
First, with regard to the objectivity of human cognitional 
activity, he notes, 
«Nor need this intentionality be inferred, for it is the domi-
nant content of the dynamic structure that assembles and unites 
several activities into a single knowing...* 5 8 
Thus, the obvious and thematic presence in the conscious 
act is the object intended. That is why Lonergan refers to it as 
the dominant, but not exclusive presence. 
The character of the presence of the subject and his act, i.e. 
consciousness, is of a different sort. Both Lonergan and Millan 
Puelles 5 9 concur in referring to it as concomitant or accompany-
ing presence. This is signified in Figure 2, where the broken line 
indicates the thematic presence of the object and the solid curve 
indicates the concomitant presences of the subject and his acts to 
himself. 
Figure 2: Presences in an operation 
Lonergan uses the metaphor of a parade to describe this 
distinction of presences: 
As the parade of objects marches by, spectators do not 
have to slip into the parade to become present to 
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themselves; they have to be present to themselves for 
anything to be present to them; and they are present to 
themselves by the same watching that, as it were, at its 
other pole makes the parade present to them. 6 0 
This presence of the subject, then, is not another spectacle 
that further subdivides the attention of the spectator by fixing it 
upon yet another object. It is presence in another dimension, cor-
relative and opposite to the presence of the object. 6 1 Objects, 
then, are present by being attended to, but subjects are present, 
not by being attended to, but by attending: 
It [the discovery of consciousness] is an awareness, not of 
what is intended, but of the intending. 6 2 
The concomitant nature of the presence of the subject and 
its act explains why the subject can be conscious, as attending, 
and yet give his whole attention to the object as attended to . 6 3 
Conn makes the excellent point that this aspect of consciousness 
...makes it possible for us to be most present to ourselves, 
to experience ourselves with an intensely heightened 
awareness, at the very time, for example, that we are 
completely absorbed by, «lost», in some especially 
engrossing book or fi lm. 6 4 
This is not the reflexive «self-consciousness» of introspection, 
which would occur, if at all, when we put down the book or 
leave the theater . 6 5 Lonergan serves notice that attempts to 
«reach back» and uncover one's subjectivity by introspection can-
not succeed. Only the subject as object would be uncovered, 
while it is the subject as subject that does the searching. He 
recommends, «To heighten one's presence to oneself, one does not 
introspect; one raises the level of one's activity.* 6 6 
At this point, it can be asked if Lonergan's description of 
consciousness corresponds to that of other philosophers such as 
Millan Puelles and Aquinas. The foregoing section seems to in-
dicate that Millan Puelles and Lonergan expound an essentially 
similar view of the appearance of the subject and its acts in a con-
comitant fashion with respect to the dominant intentional 
presence of an object. 6 7 Despite this concurrence, one can detect 
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an opposed nuance in the two authors regarding the appearance 
of the subject. 
Millan Puelles cautions that any effort whatsoever to clarify 
the subordinate nature of the self-apprehensive dimension in the 
conscious act will always be too l i tt le. 6 8 The reason for his in-
sistence would seem to be that one of the positions he is confron-
ting in his book, idealism, takes the subject as a thematic 
presence. 
Lonergan, on other hand, worries about the diametrically 
opposed danger of the wholesale neglect of the subject and its act, 
claiming, «My position cannot be understood if it is true to say 
that unumquodque cognoscitur secundum quod est obiectum.»w 
Substituting the aphorism «.unumquodque cognoscitur secun-
dum quod est actu» 7° for the above mistaken aphorism allows 
one to discover the subject as well as the object in the same act 
which is simultaneously act of the object and act of the subject: 
...inasmuch as there is a sensibile actu or an intelligibile ac-
tu, an object is known; inasmuch as there is a sensus actu 
or an intellectus actu the subject in act and his act are 
constituted and known. 7 1 
Thus, Lonergan's emphasis differs from Millan Puelles', 
because he is confronting a «conceptualist» scholasticism that he 
feels places an exaggerated importance upon the intentional 
presence of the object. 
Shifting to the compatibility of Lonergan's usage with 
Thomist thought, one must realize that «consciousness» is a 
modern term and a one-to-one correspondence with a Latin term 
in the texts of St. Thomas is neither anticipated nor found. 
Nonetheless, the Thomistic rational psychology provides abundant 
evidence that St. Thomas viewed human operations in this way 
and employed this insight in a variety of manners. 
For instance, we have just seen how Lonergan explains the 
necessity of the concomitant appearance of the subject in the 
cognitive act as a consequence of the theorem of knowledge by 
identity of the knower and the known adopted by Aquinas. Later 
in the same question St. Thomas gives the reason why this is 
so-the identity occurs by assimilation of species on the formal 
level. 
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Sicut enim sensus in actu est sensibile propter 
similitudinem sensibilis, quae est forma sensus in actu; ita 
intel lectus in actu est inte l lectum in actu propter 
similitudinem rei intellectae, quae est forma intellectus in 
actu. 7 2 
Thus, the Angelic Doctor agrees with Aristotle that 
everything is knowable as far as it is in act, but the intellect is 
in potency until actualized by the species abstracted from sensible 
things, therefore it only understands its act and itself due to a 
previous intention from which arises the impressed species of an 
object. 7 3 
Although Aquinas is speaking of cognitional acts in this 
case, it is clear that the concomitant presence of the subject in 
conscious acts is not limited to cognitional acts alone: 
In omnibus potentiis quae possunt converti in suos actus, 
prius oportet quod actus illius potentiae feratur in obiec-
tum aliud et postmodum feratus in suum actum. 7 4 
One clarification that should be made is that Lonergan takes 
a definite stand on the question of sensitive consciousness, while 
the Thomistic exegesis in general is divided. He interprets St. 
Thomas' statement that sense begins to turn back towards its 
essence as referring to the capacity of a sensitive faculty (common 
sense) to know not only the objects of the external sense but also 
their acts of sensing. 7 5 Such a partial return cannot be called 
reflection but can be called sense or empirical consciousness.7 6 
Other authors critical of Lonergan contend that Aquinas 
limited consciousness exclusively to intellectual acts. 7 7 Lonergan 
believes that this is a mistaken confusion of consciousness and 
reflection. 
To conclude, it can be said that both Millan Puelles and 
Lonergan share a Thomist conception of consciousness, although 
they defend it against opposite deviations. This does not necessari-
ly mean that their ideas regarding intentionality will necessarily 
concur. Within a philosophy such as Lonergan's that erects con-
sciousness as the locus philosophiae the temptation to fuse the sub-
ject and object as mutually conditioning terms of a conscious act 
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is strong indeed. Millan Puelles depicts such a position as 
simplistic: 
There is nothing easier than interpreting intentional 
transcendence and subjective self-consciousness as terms of 
a consciously given correlation. Both would condition one 
another mutually, in such fashion that the intentional 
transcendence would be an act exercised by the subjectivi-
ty and the subjectivity in turn, an originating principle of 
this act. 7 8 
Thus it behooves us to watch Lonergan's development 
carefully as the implications of his basic position unfold. A cor-
rect understanding of the mode of the relative presences of subject 
and object does not necessarily guarantee a sufficiently articulated 
posture regarding intentionality. 
The terminology regarding consciousness is often a verbal 
jungle, and we will try to clear up certain difficulties that arise 
with regard to consciousness and the terms «knowledge», i n -
trospection*, and «reflection». Before this, however, it will be 
necessary to briefly describe Lonergan's theory of the levels of 
conscious subjectivity, an elaboration that has come to be iden-
tified with Lonergan. 
B. Structure of Subjectivity 
Lonergan distinguishes a hierarchy among the conscious 
operations, dividing them into four levels. The agglomeration of 
operations on a single level gathers together naturally related 
operations, and the metaphor of a series of levels indicates that 
each successive group of operations depends on and integrates the 
previous levels, while at the same time transcending and com-
pleting it. Lonergan refers to this process of progressive in-
tegrating transcendence with the Hegelian term of sublation, 
although removing from his concept the Hegelian requirement 
that the higher level reconcile a contradiction in the lower. 7 9 
Since the operations on the levels are both conscious and in-
tentional, Lonergan at times speaks of levels of consciousness, on 
other occasions, of levels of intentionality. 8 0 This duality can 
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spawn variations in terminology. Moreover, since the level is nam-
ed according to the principal operation that occurs on it, and the 
operation that is «principally» of interest may vary according to 
the aspect of subjectivity under study, each level has several ap-
pellations. Figure 3 shows three possible articulations; they refer 
to exactly the same thing. 
deliberation decision responsability 
t . . t t . 
reflection judgment rationality 
t . I . I 
understanding concept intelligence t. t . t . 
experience presentations empirical 
Figure 3: The Four Levels of Conscious Intending 
To start, Lonergan excludes comas and dreamless slumber 
from consideration; they are properly ««conscious. Next, the 
minimal degree of consciousness and intentionality that our dream 
states possess is too fragmentary and incoherent to constitute these 
states as a level of conscious intending. 8 1 
The first level is (approximately) the level of internal and 
external sensation. The principal intentionalities are the selective 
attending of the five external senses, and the representation and 
creation of the imagination. 8 2 It is the level on which we «sense, 
perceive, imagine, feel, speak, move». 8 3 Lonergan refers to it as 
the level of presentations in Insight to emphasize the utterly ir-
reducible givenness of intentional contents. 8 4 In posterior works 
he abandons this terminology in favor of «experiential» or «em-
pirical» level, terms that emphasize the role of this level as the 
raw material upon which the subsequent levels act. 
The second level of conscious intending is variously referred 
to as the level of intelligence, the intellectual level, or the level of 
understanding. 8 5 The initial intending on this level is inquiry 
provoked by experience of first level, inquiry expressed in the 
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so-called questions for intelligence 8 6 (e.g. «what is it?») that seek 
unity or relatedness that organizes data into intelligible wholes. 
This is what is grasped in the act of understanding called insight. 
A further intending corresponds to conception that puts 
together both the content of insight and as much of the image as 
is essential to the concurrence of insight; it intends any concrete 
being that corresponds to this incompletely determinate (i.e. 
abstract) content. 8 7 As insights accumulate, the subject works out 
the presuppositions and implications of their expressions in an 
ever greater coherence revealed in his behavior, speech, grasp of 
situations, and mastery of particular scientific dominions. All of 
this activity is included on the second level of conscious inten-
ding. 8 8 
The intelligible organization grasped and expressed on the 
second level nonetheless may or may not be relevant to the data. 
Therefore, on the third level, intending takes the form of a 
critical evaluation, characterized by the question «Is it so?» 
directed to this intelligible content of the second level. This is 
called the level of reflection, or reflective and critical rationality, 
or the level of judgment. 8 9 The previously attained understanding 
is questioned, formulations and expressions are checked, the 
evidence for and against the understanding is marshaled, and the 
instance of understanding is either judged to be so or is rejected. 
Inasmuch as this proceeding is conscious, we can talk of rational 
consciousness. 
The fourth level is usually referred to as the level of 
deliberation or decision. 9 0 It is also called the level of respon-
sibility at times. On this level the subject deliberates about the 
truth and reality affirmed on the third level, and decides how to 
act in light of it. This supposes leaving the purely cognitional am-
bit and constituting oneself as an existential subject 9 1 that by his 
choices makes himself to be what he is to be and his world what 
it is to be . 9 2 Inasmuch these levels are experienced by the sub-
ject, they are called moral consciousness 9 3 or rational self-
consciousness,9 4 since it is on this level where we fully emerge 
as freely acting individuals. 
This four-level structure occurs in two modes, designated as 
the direct mode and introspective mode (see Figure 4). In the 
direct mode, sensation provides the data upon which subsequent 
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levels act. In the introspective mode, internal data (i.e. the data of 
consciousness) serve as data upon which the second, third, and 
fourth levels of the introspective mode work. 9 5 
direct mode 
decision 
judgment 
understandig 
experience 
(sense data) 
introspective mode 
decision 
judment 
understanding 
experience 
(data of consciousness) 
Figure 4: Direct and Introspetive Modes 
of Conscious Subjectivity 
Introspection does not mean that the acts of the direct mode 
are intuited; rather, they are experienced. 9 6 The distinction bet-
ween these modes wil l allow us to discuss the important 
methodological element of self-appropriation. 
C. Self-Appropriation 
We are now ready to glimpse what Lonergan is aiming at 
in his attempts to assist the reader in effecting a personal ap-
propriation of the concrete, dynamic structure immanent and 
recurrently operative in his own conscious activities. 9 7 
As a first step, consciousness can be explained in terms of 
the distinction of direct and introspective modes, beginning with 
empirical or biological consciousness (See Figure 5). This is the ex-
perience we have of experiencing, i.e. the experience of sensation 
that is not sensation itself. It allows us to attribute some form of 
consciousness even to animals bereft of intelligence and rationality. 
Examples of this type of consciousness are pain and hunger. 
Another example would be the experience that a kitten has in 
tasting milk, an awareness that does not accompany the growth of 
its whiskers. 
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direct mode introspective mode 
j experience | j experience 
Figure 5: Empirical Consciousness 
Lonergan, his interest in kittens somewhat limited, hastens 
to add that consciousness in humans is intelligent and rational as 
well as empir ica l . 9 8 This does not mean that consciousness 
«understands» or «reflects», but that the awareness that is con-
sciousness is an awareness that not only accompanies sensations, 
perceptions, and images, but also accompanies inquiry, insight, for-
mulation of insight, reflection, judgment, deliberating and 
deciding.(See Figure 6.) 
direct mode introspective mode 
decision 
judgment 
understanding 
experience 
experience 
Figure 6: Human Consciousness 
Lonergan uses human artifacts to illustrate intelligent con-
sciousness. One is conscious of experiencing the intelligence in the 
design of one's own artifacts or another's (as opposed to the 
frustration of not knowing what a gadget is for, or how it is to 
be correctly employed). 9 9 One experiences intelligence in the im-
proved design of a simple household tool, the gradual dominion 
attained in the use of a word-processing program, etc . 1 0 0 
Rational consciousness is experienced in our refusal to con-
tent ourselves with mere coherence (e. g. «Nice idea, but will it 
work?») . We subscribe to a grass-roots epistemology that 
distinguishes astrology from astronomy, alchemy from chemistry, 
legend from fact. 1 0 1 We extend our assent to what we are told 
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or suspend it according to the maturity, sobriety, disinterest, and 
intelligence of our interlocutors. 
Moral consciousness appears in the experience we have of 
responsible deliberations and decisions, the praise and blame that 
makes up a good part of human conversation, and in the elation 
or shame that fill us when our choices and deeds are praiseworthy 
or blameworthy. 1 0 2 
These are only a few examples that could be multiplied in-
definitely. At the moment, the crux of the matter is to compare 
Figs. 6 and 4 (supra) to notice that what we have defined as con-
sciousness is nothing other than the first level of the introspective 
mode, the «experiencing [of] one's experiencing, understanding, 
judging and deciding». 1 0 3 
Consciousness can be grasped as a unity. The distinction of 
the levels of consciousness should not lead us to a mistaken no-
tion that would multiply consciousnesses. Such a mistaken notion 
would substitute an empirical consciousness, an intelligent con-
sciousness, and a rational consciousness for a consciousness that is 
really at once empirical, intelligent, and rational. Thus to refer to 
conscious acts is to abstract from the singular fields of con-
sciousness in which they lie: 
Conscious acts are not so many isolated, random atoms 
of knowing, but many acts coalesce into a single know-
ing. Not only is there a similarity between my seeing and 
your hearing, inasmuch as both acts are conscious; there 
also is an identity involved when my seeing and my hear-
ing or your seeing and your hearing are compared. 1 0 4 
This unity of consciousness, says Lonergan, would have to 
be postulated were it not given: 
If there were not one consciousness, at once empirical, in-
telligent, and rational, how could rational judgment pro-
ceed from an unconditioned grasped in the combination 
of thought and sensible experience? 1 0 5 
However, the unity of consciousness is given, it is experienc-
ed. We can understand it and make judgments about it; this 
understanding and affirmation (or negation), however, neither in-
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creases nor decreases our consciousness, but only the formulations 
and judgments we make about it. Thus consciousness is the 
knowledge the subject has of itself as subject, while the formula-
tion and judgments that are made about consciousness are 
knowledge that the subject has of itself as object, i.e. the objec-
tification of consciousness, that Lonergan explains as the applica-
tion of the operations as intentional to the operations as con-
scious. 1 0 6 
The understanding of consciousness is precisely what we 
have been engaged in throughout this subsection. This effort to 
explicitate the unity and relatedness of the various operations 
(which exists and functions before we manage to advert to it) is 
the first step in self-appropriation. To move thusly from ex-
perience and description to explanation of consciousness is to par-
ticipate in the second level of the introspective mode of knowing, 
diagrammed in Figure 7. 
direct mode introspective mode 
decision 
judgment 
understanding 
experience 
understanding 
I t. 
experience 
Figure 7: Understanding of Consciousness 
The next step in this self-appropriating objectification of 
consciousness is reflection and judgment about the unity and 
relatedness of consciousness (see Figure 8). Lonergan asserts that 
our critical wonder poses such questions as, «Do these operation 
occur? Do they occur in the described pattern? Is not that pattern 
just hypothetical, sooner or later due for still further revi-
sion?*. 1 0 7 
THE SUBJECT IN THE METHOD OF LONERGAN 277 
direct mode 
(objective pole 
of subject) 
introspective mode 
(subjective pole 
of subject) 
decision 
judgment 
understanding 
experience 
judment 
t 
understanding 
t . 
experience 
Figure 8: Self-Appropriation 
The first judgment made on this level is the self-affirmation 
«1 am a knower». 1 0 8 Subsequent judgment and reasoning may be 
subject to revision, but this peremptory self-affirmation of con-
sciousness is not. It itself is not exactly the unrevisable rock on 
which the transcendental method is built, for the ultimate rock is 
«the subject in his conscious, unobjectified attentiveness, in-
telligence, reasonableness, responsibility.* 1 0 9 The self-affirmation is 
the first and unavoidable judgment in the objectification of this 
rock. 
In Insight, the self-appropriation appears to finish on the 
level of judgment in the introspective mode. 1 1 0 The good in his 
later works, however, becomes a distinct notion defined by a level 
of intent ional i ty superior to the rat ional . Thus full self-
appropriation would not only consist in 
1.- consciousness of experience, understanding, judging, 
and deciding; 
2.- the understanding of one's experienced experiencing, 
understanding, judging, and deciding; 
3.- the affirmation of the reality of one's experienced and 
understood experiencing, understanding, judging and 
deciding; 
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but also a further level of 
4,- deciding to operate in accord with the norms imma-
nent in the spontaneous relatedness of one's experienced, 
understood, and affirmed experiencing, understanding, 
judging and deciding. 1 1 1 
Thus, according to the scheme we have been following, full 
self-appropriation or what Lonergan at times calls «self-possession» 
will appear as shown in Figure 9 . 1 1 2 
objective pole subjective pole 
decision 
judgment 
[understanding] 
experience 
decision 
judment 
understanding 
expedience 
Figure 9: Self-Possession 
We can now return to complete our consideration of con-
sciousness in Lonergan. 
D. Consciousness and Reflection 
The previous exposition of the structure of conscious inten-
ding will allow a clarification of the relation of consciousness to 
introspection, knowledge, and reflection. We have already touched 
on the fact that consciousness is not intuition. This is the 
clarification which Lonergan takes the greatest pains to make: 
...the word, introspection...is misleading inasmuch as it 
suggests an inward inspection. Inward inspection is just 
myth. Its origin lies in the mistaken analogy that all 
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cognitional events are to be conceived on the analogy of 
ocular vision; therefore, consciousness is to be conceived 
on the analogy of ocular vision; and since it does not in-
spect outwardly, it must be an inward inspection. 1 1 3 
Introspection may be correctly understood not as equated 
with consciousness, but rather «the process of objectifying the 
contents of consciousness,* 1 1 4 as we have seen in the previous 
subsection. 
Lonergan explains that consciousness must be considered as 
experience instead of intuition not only in the awareness of em-
pirical level stimuli, but also on the superior levels: 
What is asserted is not that you can uncover intelligence 
by introspection, as you can point to Calcutta on a map. 
The assertion is that you have conscious states and con-
scious acts that are intelligent and reasonable. Intelligent 
and rational consciousness denote characters of the cogni-
tional process, and the characters they denote pertain not 
to the contents but to the proceeding. 1 1 5 
His most refined writing on this theme is found in his 
distinction between the correct conception (conscientia-experientia) 
and the erroneous one (conscientia-perceptio), in one of his 
prepared classroom texts. 1 1 6 There he concludes that when con-
sciousness is conceived of as an experience there is a psychological 
subject, since consciousness is not merely cognitive but also con-
stitutive of the psychological unity of subject as subject. If con-
sciousness were to be viewed as merely cognitive, it would reveal 
no more than a psychological unity in the field of objects. 
The reference to consciousness as «cognitive» suggests 
another question. Can consciousness be said to be a type of 
knowledge? Lonergan tends to distinguish the two. For instance, 
in speaking of the subject he states, «It is conscious, but that does 
not mean that it is known*. 1 1 7 Elsewhere he asserts that cogni-
tional activities may be conscious yet none or only some of them 
may be known. 1 1 8 
St. Thomas does not appear to share the same scruples. In 
the Summa, he distinguishes two types of self presence that would 
seem to correspond to Lonergan's consciousness and objectifica-
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tion of consciousness. Both are termed knowledge («cogni-
tiones»). 119 
It seems that Lonergan adheres to a verbal usage stricter 
than that of Aquinas, in which a distinction is made between 
knowing in a loose or generic sense, which could be applied to 
any individual cognitional element including consciousness, and 
knowing in a strict and specific sense that is a structure composed 
of multiple cognitional operations culminating in the judgment. 1 2 0 
Lonergan notes: 
...The real...is what is to be known by the knowing con-
stituted by experience and inquiry, insight and hypothesis, 
reflection and verification. Our present point is that, 
besides knowing in that rather complex sense, there is 
also «knowing» in the elementary sense in which kittens 
know the «reality» of mi lk . 1 2 1 
If Lonergan admits this double sense, it remains that he 
tends to reserve the term «knowledge» exclusively for its strict 
sense, especially in his later works. Unless the context otherwise 
indicates, Lonergan must be taken to use knowledge in its strict 
sense. 
Finally, it is worth the effort to make a disjunction between 
consciousness and reflection, especially reflection considered as 
reflexive self-knowledge. The issue is complicated by the various 
meanings «reflection» can assume, which we will now briefly 
review. 
Lonergan distinguishes between conversio ad phantasmata, 
reflection on phantasm, reflective understanding, and objectifica-
tion of consciousness. Conversion to phantasm is argued by 
Lonergan to simply indicate a natural orientation of possible in-
tellect to encounter its object, «quidditas rei materialis,» in the 
phantasm, and not somewhere else. It is preconceptual, thus it 
supposes no previous knowledge; thus it is not really a reflection 
despite the etymological connotations of «to convert*. 1 2 2 
Reflection on phantasm is a post-conceptual return to the 
phantasm by which the intellect moves from an universal to a 
particular object of thought and can mean the material singular 
without understanding it or explaining it fully. 1 2 3 
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An act of reflective understanding is the weighing of 
evidence, both sensible and intelligible, present and remembered, 
prior to the judgment. 1 2 4 
Reflective self-knowledge is a second intention, by which we 
turn fully back on ourselves by making ourselves the object of our 
intention. This is what St. Thomas would seem to refer to by in-
dicating that it is one act by which the intellect perceives a stone, 
and another by which it understands itself to perceive a stone. 1 2 5 
With respect to consciousness, then, the following may be 
noted. Conversion to phantasm and reflection on phantasm are 
acts of second level of consciousness; they are conscious, but not 
consciousness. Reflective understanding is a conscious act of the 
third level of understanding; similarly, it is conscious, but not 
consciousness. 
The greatest difficulty arises with regard to the relation of 
reflexive self-knowledge to consciousness. For Lonergan, «self-
knowledge is the reduplicated structure: it is experience, 
understanding, and judging with respect to experience, understan-
ding and judging*. Consciousness, on the other hand, «is not 
knowing knowing but merely experience of knowing*. 1 2 6 
It would seen that there is no argument over the existence 
of two types of self-knowledge. St. Thomas contends: 
...per actum suum se cognoscit intellectus noster. Et hoc 
dupliciter. Uno quidem modo, particulariter, secundum 
quod Socrates vel Plato percipit se habere animam in-
tellectivam, ex hoc quod percipit se intelligere. Alio 
modo, in universali, secundum quod naturam humanae 
mentis ex actu intellectus consideramus... Est autem dif-
ferentia inter has duas cognitiones. Nam ad primam 
cognitionem de mente habendam, sufficit ipsa mentis 
praesentia, quae est principium actus ex quo mens percipit 
seipsam. Et ideo dicitur se cognoscere per suam praesen-
tiam. Sed ad secundum cognitionem de mente habendam, 
non sufficit eius praesentia, sed requiritur diligens et sub-
tilis inquisitio. 1 2 7 
The dispute arises in the labeling of these two types of self-
knowledge. Some authors reserve consciousness* exclusively for 
the second type . 1 2 8 Lonergan asserts that the first type is con-
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sciousness and the second type is objectification of consciousness 
(see Fig. 8), which, while itself conscious and while presupposing 
consciousness, is not to be identified with consciousness. Thus it 
would be incorrect to exclude the knowledge of self in direct acts 
from consciousness, for this knowledge is not unconscious. 1 2 9 It 
is conscious, but concomitant. 
Reflexive self-knowledge cannot constitute consciousness in 
its entirety. Even though, as objectification of consciousness, it 
takes consciousness as a presupposition (i.e., the internal data of 
self upon which reflexive self-knowledge reflects), the second in-
tention (or third intention, and so on) in which the reflection 
consists is itself unreflected and conscious. A new act wi l l 
elucidate the higher-order intention by giving it expression, but 
this new act will in turn remain unreflected. 1 3 0 
The implication is that the subject is capable of knowledge 
of itself not just as an object but precisely as a subject, yet, this 
self-knowledge never exhausts itself thematically. Three points 
need to be taken into consideration regarding the relation between 
the reflexive acts by which it knows itself as an object, and the 
direct acts in which it can know itself as a subject that is con-
comitantly present. First, the difference between reflexive and 
direct acts is material, not formal: 
The ordinary operations of intellect are attending, inquir-
ing, understanding, conceiving, doubting, weighing the 
evidence, judging. Their objects may be either the self or 
other things. In the former case they are named reflexive; 
in the latter, direct. This difference is not formal but 
material; in both cases the formal objects are ens, quid-
ditas, verum. Now by both direct and reflexive operations 
the subject in act is constituted and known, not as object, 
but as subject; this constitutive knowing and being 
known is consciousness. Hence, in direct activity the sub-
ject is known once, and as subject; but in reflexive activi-
t y the subject is known twice, as subject by con-
sciousness, and as object by the reflexive activity. 1 3 1 
Secondly, the relation between reflexive and direct activity is 
functional, since direct activity via consciousness provides the data 
for reflection. 
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...just as the data for direct activity are supplied by sense, 
so the data for reflexive activity are supplied by con-
sciousness. Hence, just as I think of «this» by a backward 
reference to sense, so I think of «1» by a backward 
reference to the conscious subject; in both cases one is 
thinking of the particular; and we think of particulars, 
not because we understand particularity, but because our 
inquiry and understanding suppose and regard data. 1 3 2 
Thirdly, this analogy of consciousness in the introspective 
mode to sense in the direct mode is manifest in a verification 
prior to judgment in the introspective mode that parallels the 
recourse that scientists have to needles on dials, comparisons of et-
chings on sticks, etc... to verify their concepts of the direct mode: 
...just as our judgments about material things involve a 
verification of concepts in the data of sense, so our 
judgments about our feelings, our minds, our wills in-
volve a verification of concepts in the data of con-
sciousness. It was this parallelism in function that led me 
to speak of conscientia-experientia. 133 
Having made these precisions about consciousness, we are now 
ready to give and consider Lonergan's basic philosophical position, 
which in addition to the self-affirming subject, must commit itself 
to a treatment of the notions of being and objectivity. 
UI. BASIC POSITION 
Here we shall finish our overview of Lonergan's thought by 
showing how his approach to subjectivity must be completed by 
a stand regarding being and objectivity before grounding a critical 
metaphysics. 
A. Being 
Lonergan maintains the themes of being and objectivity 
separated from his initial expositions of knowing activities. The 
first two questions he asks are «What am I doing when I am 
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knowing?* and «Why is doing that knowing?*. Only afterwards 
does he turn to the problem of «What do I know when I do 
i t?» . 1 3 4 
Self-affirmation enables one to begin the discussion of being 
by taking into account the implications of the dynamism of our 
intellect: a pure unrestricted orientation toward new data, 
understanding of the intelligible in the sensible, the trustworthy 
sureties of reflection. One need not presuppose yet unestablished 
evidences, claims Lonergan, but rather define being in terms of 
this primordial intention and its articulations in the structure of 
subjectivity. 
Lonergan proceeds to do just this. Each of the various 
manifestations of the conscious intending of the subject that pro-
gressively unfold on the three cognitive levels remit to a different 
aspect of being. Thus he speaks of the notion of being in front 
of data, the concept of being that has its origin in the act of 
understanding, and the notion of existence that anticipates the 
reality known in the judgment. 
1. Notion of Being 
One must first distinguish between the notion of being and 
the concept of being in Lonergan. These terms may seem similar 
in common parlance, but each holds a precise technical 
significance for him. A notion, for example, is an intelligent inten-
tion present in consciousness. 1 3 5 
The notion of being is none other than the immanent, 
dynamic orientation of cognitional process, i.e. the pure desire to 
know, which Lonergan describes throughout the first half of In-
sight. 1 3 6 The identification is strict. The light of our intellects, 
our power of knowing inasmuch as it becomes conscious- is 
already a natural and innate notion, a notion of being that 
becomes present once it is actuated in the face of data. 1 3 7 
Lonergan notes that a distinction has to be drawn between 
the spontaneously operative notion of being and the theoretical 
accounts of its genesis and content. The spontaneous notion func-
tions similarly in all men, regardless of the theoretical account of 
this notion they come to accept. 1 3 8 
THE SUBJECT IN THE METHOD OF LONERGAN 285 
2. Concept of Being 
This spontaneously operative notion can be itself objectified 
and expressed in a concept. It is a concept in a mitigated or 
secondary sense, since it is an expression of how the intended is 
sought, and does not respond to an understanding of the intended. 
The concept of being and all transcendental concepts, as Lonergan 
uses the term, are of this type. A concept that does not tell us 
the meaning of being, but how that meaning is to be assigned, 
represents a heuristic approach to being. 
To take a heuristic approach in front of an unknown is to 
set down immediately what can be known about the unknown 
with the hope of finding therein a guide to a solution 1 3 9 . The 
assignment of the unknown as «x» in a problem that permits an 
algebraic solution, or the positing of general differential and con-
servation equations in problems of natural sciences are examples 
of heuristic procedures. What is immediately known about being 
is that it is the objective of the universally accessible dynamism 
of the human intellect, and this is the psychological fact that 
Lonergan claims must be exploited in our discussions about being. 
Thus, the concept of being is defined by Lonergan: «Being... 
is the objective of the pure desire to know.» 1 4 0 The dynamic 
orientation at the root of the knowing process, the inquiring and 
critical spirit of man, the imperturbable drive of successive ques-
tions in the genesis of truth, has an objective. If it were satisfied 
with the mere act of judging, it would ignore the content of the 
judgment in which knowing culminates. On the contrary, it 
scorns mistaken judgments and prizes correct ones. Therefore, the 
desire has an objective, and this is called being. 1 4 1 
Being defined as a supreme heuristic content may appear less 
than satisfactory as a definition, having the appearance of identify-
ing the idea of being with the the idea of nothing, a Hegelian 
position. Lonergan counters by claiming that being should be con-
sidered not as an idea at all, but rather as an anticipation. As a 
natural conscious intention it cannot be nothing. One must 
distinguish, he claims: 
...between the way there is nothing in a box and the way 
there is nothing in a stomach. When there is nothing in 
a box, a box does not feel empty, when there is nothing 
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in a stomach, the stomach does feel empty. Human in-
telligence is more like a stomach than a box. Though it 
has no answers, and so is empty, it can still ask ques-
tions... For questioning goes beyond an already known to 
an unknown that is to be known... the already known is 
the datum, and the unknown to be known is being. 1 4 2 
Thus, the concept of being is not completely empty. 
Although it has no conceptual content, it has a heuristic content. 
The mathematician at least anticipates that the solution «x» to his 
equation will turn out to be a number. Since being is the supreme 
heuristic content, the philosopher anticipates that his «x» will be 
all-inclusive. 1 4 3. 
Lonergan does not first determine the concept of being and 
then look for its range. The infinite range enters into the 
heuristic content of the concept itself. 1 4 4 Thus, the concept we 
are able to form of being is the connection we make between a 
spontaneously experienced intellectual activity that is unrestricted 
and the unrestricted objective it pursues. 
Since the only characteristic Lonergan treats under the 
heading of the concept of being (as opposed to the notion of be-
ing) is its all-inclusiveness, it would seem that he views being first 
and foremost as a totality, the universe: 
...by «being» we mean, not only this and that being, but 
everything, totality, the universe. 1 4 5 
Let us note two consequences of this approach to «being» as 
totality. First, it would seem to put an idea of being, in 
Lonergan's sense of a conceptual content, beyond our reach. The 
act of understanding being would be to know everything about 
everything. It is impossible for a finite intellect. 1 4 6 Secondly, this 
would rule out any type of apprehension or intuition of being 
received within the process of knowing a material individual. 
3. Notion of Existence 
It is only after being emerges in our knowledge as a single 
notion of totality that Lonergan proceeds to deal with being in the 
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sense of ens. In this sense, being is still not identifiable with any 
single conceptual content, but rather is a unity of function in 
varied and disparate contents, namely, the relation or proportion 
of the essence (as conceived) to the existence (as affirmed). 1 4 7 
Like Fabro, 1 4 8 he insists that the Thomist esse does not 
arise through a contrast with essence, but through the clarification 
of the complex of ens, which in some way comprises both essence 
and esse. However, in Fabro, the ens is an apprehended id quod 
est that embraces both the content (essence) and its act (esse). In 
Lonergan, the ens is the content (essence) along with the anticipa-
tion of esse provided by the natural intention of being. 
Thus, it is the notion of existence as anticipation that 
Lonergan employs to distance his position from that of essen-
tialism. He casts his clarification in the traditional example bet-
ween humanity and man. Essentialism in his view consists in 
treating all concepts as if they were the type exemplified by 
humanity or particular instances of humanity. In an insight into 
data, the essentialist considers a compound of matter and form. 
Man is taken as a certain mode of humanity, a mode that must 
be added to have the being «man.» 1 4 9 
However, the matter and form can be considered inasmuch 
as it is a differentiation of being. In this case, a man is conceived 
(and can be affirmed) because matter and form are considered in 
conjunction with the finality of intellect toward being. The being 
is from the intention of being, and the intelligible form in sensi-
ble matter determines the content. The ens, and not abstract form, 
is thought because the matter and form are not considered in 
themselves, but as part of a whole of something that exists. The 
judgment confirms that it does exist. It is obvious that Lonergan 
is one with the essentialists in his view that existence is known 
in judgment and not in a prior apprehension. The difference lies 
in his distinction between the essence and ens. The «esse» latent 
in this ens is not a subliminally present act of a confused ap-
prehension, as Fabro would have it, but rather the intention of 
being or light of the intellect itself in its virtuality as a notion 
(conscious intention) of existence. 
To close, definition as the supreme heuristic content vests be-
ing with an unaccustomed diffidence. As the objective of the pure 
desire, it could be one or many, material or ideal, phenomenal 
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or real, immanent content or transcendent object. In addition to 
the fundamental correlation between knowing and being as totali-
ty, one would want to know if we know extramental beings. 
These basic questions about being can only be answered after a 
pattern of appropriate judgments, the result of the functioning of 
the pure desire, decides each question as we shall see in the 
following section. 
B. Objectivity 
An object can be spoken of in many ways. One could speak 
linguistically of an object that is the complement of a transitive 
verb. In this sense, Lonergan sticks «being» after the infinitive «to 
know»; knowing is knowing being. 
The object can be spoken of in metaphysical terms. 
Lonergan holds that Aquinas developed his rational psychology in 
terms of agent objects that exercise efficient causality, terminal ob-
jects that immanently exercise final causality, and final objects that 
exercise final causality externally. 1 5 0 
As Lonergan developed his own thought, the adoption of a 
critical ground of metaphysics in the subject required that inten-
tionality replace causality as the cognitionally prior proportion of 
act to an object. 1 5 1 He will have to develop a notion of objec-
tivity in consonance with the intentionality he has proposed, 
specifically, with his notion (intention) of being. In this section 
we shall first treat his principal notion of objectivity, which 
depends on his concept of being. Next, we shall review three par-
tial aspects of objectivity that derive from the articulation of the 
notion of being. 
1. Principal Notion of Objectivity 
In the last subsection, Lonergan's approach to objectivity 
made an appearance in the discussion of how being can be at the 
same time one and many. Being most properly refers to the 
heuristically anticipated concrete universe of intelligibility. The 
dividing of this being into multiple beings as it becomes known 
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is allotted to the work of the judgment; this analysis brings us ob-
jects or individual beings. 1 5 2 Lonergan calls this notion the prin-
cipal notion of objectivity. 
Despite the absolute character of the virtually unconditioned, 
a single judgment cannot explain a subject-object relation accor-
ding to Lonergan. An absolutely objective single judgment is 
«quite compatible with the affirmation that there is but one being, 
that there is no object except the affirming subject.* 1 5 3 Thus 
while the realm of being is entered by one judgment, several 
judgments are needed to posit, distinguish, and relate beings. 
The principal notion of objectivity, then, is the implicit 
definition 1 5 4 of the terms «subject» and «object» by a patterned 
context of judgments. To establish objectivity in the philosophical 
context, one of the judgments must affirm a knowing subject in 
the fashion of «1 am a knower», and another must deny that this 
knowing subject would be at least one of the other elements. 1 5 5 
Thus, if the pattern of judgments: 
* A is, B is, «1» am. 
* A is neither B nor «1». 
* B is not «1». 
were affirmed, then a subject and two objects would be affirm-
ed. 1 5 6 An indefinitely large number of other objects can be added 
by further positive and negative judgments and some of these ob-
jects could be subjects if their intelligence could be grasped in-
telligently and affirmed reasonably. 
The significance of Lonergan's placing the emergence of the 
principal notion of objectivity only in a constellation of ap-
propriate judgments goes beyond the denial that an object is ob-
tained in one judgment, for still less could it appear «in any ex-
periential or normative factor that occurs in cognitional process 
prior to judgment.* 1 5 7 In other words, objects are not intuited. 
What is the validity of this objectivity? The validity of the 
judgments that define it. If the judgments are correct, it is correct 
that there are the defined objects. If the judgments are probable, 
there probably are the objects defined. 
Being is a supreme heuristic content, initially indeterminate, 
and becomes determinate inasmuch as judgments are made. Thus 
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if judgments can be made in the pattern described, there is objec-
tivity. If such judgments cannot be made, there is no objectivity. 
Thus Lonergan feels that there is no question of bridging a 
gap between the subject and beings with a «look» at an object. 
Since being is a totality, there is nothing apart from it, not even 
a subject: «The subject has to be before he can look, and once he 
is, then he is not outside being but either the whole or part of 
i t . » 1 5 8 If he is not the only object, he can only begin to know 
others by making judgments of two types: 1) about the multiplici-
ty of parts (A is, B is, A is not B) and 2) about the intelligences 
that know them («1» am A, C is a knower). 
2. Partial Aspects of Objectivity 
Latent in Lonergan's rejection of knowing as intuition is the 
rejection of the object as the intuited. He thus parts company 
with the etymological root of the word , 1 5 9 and its Kantian 
systematization, 1 6 0 as well as the prevailing view of his Anglo-
American cultural matrix, dominated as it is by empiricism and 
logical positivism. 
Lonergan's theory of insight would seem to prohibit the 
constitution of the object through intuition. His insights are not 
intuitions; they are the grasp of a formal aspect that may be rele-
vant to what one is imagining and (if one's imagining is sufficient-
ly accurate) to what is really so. 
Thus, in Lonergan's view, objects are what are intended in 
questioning and responded to by answers to questions. The cogni-
tional operation immediately related to objects is not sensitive in-
tuition, but rather questioning. Obviously he is substituting the 
intention of being for intuition as the ground of objectivity: 
This intrinsic relation of the dynamic structure of human 
knowing to being and so to reality primarily is not... in-
tentio intenta but intentio intendens. It is the originating 
drive of human knowing. 1 6 1 
The intentio intenta or object is intrinsically related to being 
and reality through the dynamism of the intentio intendens of the 
i 
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subject, which summons forth and integrates cognitional activities. 
The two are not related to reality in exactly the same way, 
however: 
The intentio intendens is not knowing but merely inten-
ding: it is objectivity in potency. But the intentio intenta 
resides not in mere intending but in structured activities 
of knowing: it is objectivity in act . 1 6 2 
Since the structuring cognitional acts occur on different 
levels, the radical intending will be objectified in an intentio inten-
ta that unites partial objects determined by these varied activities. 
Thus objectivity in act, because it resides not in a single operation 
but in a structured manifold of operations, is not a single proper-
ty of human knowing, but a compound of different properties. 1 6 3 
There are three auxiliary aspects of Lonergan's theory of objectivi-
ty: experiential objectivity, normative objectivity, and absolute ob-
jectivity. They are necessary but partial antecedent notions to the 
principal notion, each related to a level of cognitive subjectivity. 
Experiential objectivity is the given character of the given. 1 6 4 
This means that the field of materials that we experience is un-
questionable and indubitably experienced, for the minute we start 
to ground, distinguish, speculate about, doubt, or affirm these ex-
periences we have entered the levels of understanding or judg-
ment. The given is by nature somewhat diffuse, since the attempt 
to clarify it (for example, to wonder whether an experience is a 
dream or hallucination) is already part of the level of understan-
ding. 
The given is diffuse because it is defined extrinsically in 
terms of understanding and judgment, instead of entering into 
their definition. Judgment presupposes understanding, understan-
ding presupposes a field of materials of inquiry that Lonergan 
labels «residual», what remains when the intelligent and reasonable 
elements are subtracted from its structure. 1 6 5 
Thus experiential objectivity is not an intuition of an object 
in Lonergan, but rather the aspect of equal validity that all data 
possess. 1 6 6 Instead of resting upon sensation as a fraction of the 
data that is supposedly more «objective» and trustworthy, «it in-
volves no description of the stream of sensitive consciousness* nor 
theory of that stream. 1 6 7 Lonergan's experiential objectivity is 
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that aspect of the given such that all the given equally provides 
material for the intention of being or pure desire to know. 
In the second auxi l iary notion, normative objectivity, 
Lonergan seeks to situate within his theory the everyday usage of 
«objective» as equivalent to «sound», «measured», «unbiased». 
Lonergan observes that these laudatory adjectives, and their pe-
jorative antonyms, refer most properly to the intention of being 
or pure desire to know. 1 6 8 
Thus, normative objectivity is the ability of the intention of 
being to lay down the standards for the initiation and modus 
operandi of our thinking and judging. It opposes any obstacle that 
hides or blocks access to the truth, it refuses to let other human 
desires or drives inhibit the cognitional process or reinforce it in 
a well-meaning but disorienting way. It distinguishes between 
sound questions and illegitimate ones. 
Lonergan has already signaled that a dynamic orientation 
such as the pure desire to know defines its objective. Here he 
adds that it also defines the means toward that objective, i.e. that 
the pure desire to know places normative requirements upon any 
logic or method. Thus normative objectivity requires that the 
principles of identity, contradiction, and the excluded middle find 
their ultimate ground in the pure desire to know. 1 6 9 Without 
these principles, the pure desire would not function in the way 
we experience it. 
Absolute objectivity is the aspect of objectivity we attribute 
to a single judgment. If the absolute character of the virtually un-
conditioned is grasped in reflexive insight and posited in judg-
ment, it is a de facto absolute. 1 7 0 And because human knowing 
reaches such an unconditioned, it transcends itself. 1 7 1 
In virtue of this aspect judgments may shared by more than 
one person. Without the absolute aspect of the virtually uncondi-
tioned, one could only have access to one's own judgments since 
the experiences and thinking of no two people are exactly alike. 
This may be explained from a different angle by saying that the 
content of a judgment, being absolute, is withdrawn from relativi-
ty to the subject. Neil Armstrong walking on the moon was a 
contingent, localized, event of specific duration. But if it is true 
that he did walk on the moon, no one, anywhere, at anytime can 
truly deny that he did. 
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Lonergan sharpens his critique of various philosophical posi-
tions in light of the partial aspects of objectivity he has sketched. 
Most errors, he contends, comprise the taking of one partial com-
ponent of objectivity as the sum and total objectivity of human 
knowledge, ignoring the contributions of other intellectual opera-
t ions. 1 7 2 This dialectic critique would seem to be demanded by 
Lonergan's approach to objectivity that «does not decide between 
empiricism and rationalism, positivism and idealism, existentialism 
and realism, but leaves that decision to the content of the correct 
judgments that are made.. . 1 7 3 To defend the truth-value of our 
knowledge of extramental reality commits one to a continual 
dialectic on many fronts, with no prospect of definitively settling 
which judgments are proper. 
If judgments occur in the appropriate pattern, there is a 
plurality of objects and subjects. If there is only one true judg-
ment (e.g. affirmation of the Hegelian idea), the notion of objec-
tivity as Lonergan presents it undergoes no formal modification. 
Likewise, a relativist could accept the theory although he would 
deny that absolute objectivity is reached. 
Lonergan not only enters into this dialectic, 1 7 4 but he in-
corporates it into his method of metaphysics, as we shall see in 
the following section. 
C. Transcendental Method and Metaphysics 
The structure of the self-appropriated subject, along with the 
related ideas of being and objectivity, constitutes Lonergan's «basic 
position», a touchstone by which any philosophical development 
may be judged. To contradict the «basic position» would be to 
violate, in the act or performance of proposing such a develop-
ment, the very exigencies of the intimate subjectivity of the pro-
ponent of the development. 1 7 5 
This method of exposition in philosophy is called a «dialec-
tic of performance and concept» by E. Coreth, a terminology we 
prefer . 1 7 6 The unfolding of the pure desire to know as 
understood by Lonergan demands a basic position comprises the 
conditions of the performance of thinking and affirming any 
philosophical position or conceptual content. 
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The dialectic operative in philosophy is, then, not so much 
a Hegelian conceptual clash between opposed positions as a dialec-
tic within the mind of man between the free operation of his 
drive to know and the factors of his consciousness that would in-
hibit this drive.This dialectic contains the notable presuppositions 
that cognitional theory exercises a fundamental influence in 
metaphysics, ethics, and theology; that cognitional theory is deter-
mined by an appeal to the data of consciousness and to the 
historical development of human knowledge; that cognitional 
theory is not complete without some stand on basic issues in 
philosophy 1 7 7 ; and that the cognitional theory plus this stand 
constitutes a basic position that does not enter into the dialectic 
of performance and concept, but ever remaining the same, judges 
the performance that forms part of this dialectic. The failure to 
explicitate this pre-metaphysical knowledge is the root of 
Lonergan's dissatisfaction with purely deductive metaphysical 
methods: 
The most proximate development of the basic position, 
metaphysics, in its explicit form is the conception, affirmation and 
implementation of the integral heuristic structure of being that is 
proportionate to our experience. 1 7 8 As an implementation, it is 
formally dependent on the cognitional theory of the transcenden-
tal method. As the empty structure which instances of our know-
ing fill, it is materially dependent on science and common sense. 
Lonergan next seeks the heuristic elements of metaphysics 
derived from its formal dependence on cognitional theory. The 
structure of intrinsically intelligent being must parallel the struc-
ture of the acts by which it is known; according to this isomor-
phism, there are components of proportionate being labeled poten-
cy, form, and act that respectively correspond to the experience, 
explanatory understanding, and judgment of the subject. These are 
in turn divided using epistemological criteria into central potency, 
central form, and central act as opposed to conjugate potency, 
conjugate form, and conjugate act . 1 7 9 
This last distinction signifies attainment of the scholastic 
components of rea l i ty parting from the structure of our 
knowledge since central potency is equivalent to prime matter, 
central form to substantial form, and central act to the act of ex-
istence; thus «central» can be thought of as what pertains to what 
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has traditionally been called substantial. «Conjugate» applies to 
what has traditionally been called an accident, with the differen-
ce that it is obtained by scientific explanation instead of descrip-
tion. 
The isomorphism between knowledge and the known sug-
gests to Lonergan a dynamic orientation within being that would 
parallel the pure desire to know. He concludes that this is finality, 
which is understood by a «genetic method» capable of grasping 
development. Development is comprised of the upwardly mobile 
relations of the genera and species that Lonergan bases in explana-
tion rather than description. 1 8 0 
In the sixteenth chapter of Insight, titled «Metaphysics as 
Science*, Lonergan tests his method of metaphysics and the six 
metaphysical elements in a series of metaphysical questions. With 
the exception of the contrast between the descriptive ten 
categories of Aristotle and his own six explanatory metaphysical 
elements, he claims to arrive at an Aristotelian-Thomistic position 
which includes a hierarchy of grades of being in an objectively 
ordered universe, matter and a spirit capable of operation indepen-
dent of matter and the empirical residue, formal cause and formal 
effect, intrinsic and extrinsic denomination, distinctions and rela-
t ions. These results are seen as significant for vindicating 
Lonergan's method, for the novelty is that «They are obtained 
without any appeal to authorities...[and] without deductions that 
claim to be self-evident, yet, in fact are not self-evident to 
everybody.* 1 8 1 Lonergan quickly desists from his consideration of 
specific metaphysical questions; he does not intend to write a 
metaphysical manual based on his method, but only to establish 
the possibility of doing so. 
D. Further Applications of Transcendental Method 
It will only be possible to briefly indicate other possibilities 
that Lonergan attributes to the transcendental method. Firstly, 
Lonergan proposes a general theory of interpretation based on the 
attainment of a universal viewpoint, which he has previously at-
tempted to demonstrate as possible and as grounded in his cogni-
tional theory. 1 8 2 
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A further prospectus is given in Insight: 
The self-appropriation of one's own intellectual and ra-
tional self-consciousness begins as cognitional theory, ex-
pands into a metaphysics and an ethics, mounts to a con-
ception and an affirmation of God, only to be confronted 
with a problem of evil that demands the transformation 
of self-reliant intelligence into an intellectus quaerens 
fidem. 183 
Lonergan holds that conscious moral activity that issues in 
a dialectic of positions and counter-positions headed toward 
ultimate value, similar to the dialectic of metaphysics. The chapter 
concludes with a broaching of the problem of evil and man's need 
of liberation. 1 8 4 
Prompted by these concerns, Lonergan addresses himself to 
the topic of transcendent knowledge. Based on the unrestricted 
aim of the pure desire to know, he concludes that we can have 
knowledge of what we cannot experience, i.e. beyond propor-
tionate being. There follow several reformulations of traditional 
proofs of the existence of God, centering on the incomplete in-
telligibility of a universe of contingent being bereft of its transcen-
dent ground. 1 8 5 
In the last chapter, the «heuristic structure of the solution of 
the problem of evil» is sought. It is found to include a God-given 
aid which introduces the subject to the conjugate forms of faith, 
hope, and love; the collaboration in the transmittal of this solu-
tion, and even the survival of this collaboration against the in-
roads of heresy. This a-priori philosophical derivation of God's 
redemptive plan reached by speculation on the human condition 
caps Insight.186 The reader is invited to look into history and the 
current world situation to identify the solution. 
The transcendental method has implications not only for a 
general treatise on the possibil ity of faith, but also for a 
theoretical account of the content of that faith, i.e. theology. 
Lonergan traces the combination of the formal anthropological 
component of the transcendental method and the «material» com-
ponent of religious experience in his work Method in Theology. 
The first half of the work is a general consideration of 
transcendental method and religion that concludes in proposing a 
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«framework for collaborative creativity* among theologians that 
consists in eight «functional specialties* or clusters of operations 
that theologians perform. The second half of the book examines 
these functional specialties one by one. 
IV. THE SUBJECT 
We first begin with a study that compares the subject that 
Lonergan is exposing with other concepts that are more tradi-
tional and perhaps more familiar. This distinction will allow us to 
move back and forth between Lonergan's intentionality analysis 
and his critical metaphysics without confusion. 1 8 7 The latter part 
of the section delves into the active and constitutive principle of 
the transcendental subject that structures the subject on all its 
levels. We will see that its importance in Lonergan cannot be 
overemphasized. 1 8 8 
A. The Subject as a Unity 
The bedrock of metaphysically based anthropologies are the 
concepts of person and the soul. Neither is equivalent to the sub-
ject as Lonergan uses the term. It is fitting, therefore, to examine 
these differences and we begin with the the soul and the subject. 
1. Subject and Soul 
The study of the subject is seen by Lonergan as a remedy 
for the limitations that the study of the soul supposes for an-
thropology or psychology. What does Lonergan understand by the 
soul, and why does he consider it insufficient for the study of 
man? 
Lonergan accepts the Aristotelian definition of soul that was 
subsumed by Aquinas: the first act of an organic body. 1 8 9 Plants, 
animals, and men all possess souls by this account; their essential 
differences are sought by one and the same method: discover the 
objects that specify the acts of the organism, deduce the potencies 
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that permit these acts, and use these potencies to differentiate the 
different types of souls according to their essence. 1 9 0 
Lonergan opines that this Aristotelian method does not 
distinguish sharply enough between the biological and the 
psychological orders. Objects that are related only causally to 
their acts such as growth to nutrition of plants, 1 9 1 are treated in 
the same way as objects that are the intentional terms of con-
scious acts, as occurs in sensation 1 9 2 and intellection. 1 9 3 The latter 
are not only causal but also intentional; they not only can be 
reached by a deduction from their objects but also reveal 
themselves in the immediate data of consciousness; unlike merely 
causal acts they reveal as well the intending subject. 1 9 4 Thus 
Lonergan pinpoints his objection: 
The study of the soul is completely objective. One and 
the same method is applied to [the] study of plants, 
animals, and men. The results are completely universal. 
We have souls whether we are awake or asleep, saints or 
sinners, geniuses or imbeciles. 1 9 5 
Lonergan suggests that the scholastic sequence of specifying 
acts by their objects, habits by their acts, potencies by their 
habits, and essence or soul by its potencies, is needlessly cumber-
some for the study of man, and tends to distract attention from 
the most important part of the sequence-acts. Man's acts or 
operations can be known directly without insertion into this 
deductive scheme: 
The study of the subject...prescinds from the soul, its 
essence, its potencies, its habits, for none of these is given 
in consciousness. It attends to operations and to their 
center and source which is the self. 1 9 6 
A series of questions quickly arises in light of this posture: 
even granted the study of man to be too objective in the 
Aristotelian scheme, is it not true that the development of the 
concept of the person during centuries of philosophical speculation 
remedied this defect before the close of the Medieval era? Does 
Lonergan simply mean by subject what the scholastics meant by 
person? How can the study of the subject have been neglected for 
centuries, as Lonergan claims, given the availability of the concept 
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of person} Several comparative digressions will aid in understan-
ding Lonergan's position. 
2. The Person 
Etienne Gilson finds Greek philosophical anthropology in-
sufficient to explain the eminent worth of a human person, 1 9 7 
parallel to the insufficiency Lonergan encounters in the same 
tradition for the study of the subject. The admittedly frequent ex-
altation of man in Greek literature and philosophy regarded not 
the individual man but rather the collective, the species, the idea 
Man, humanity. 
In Plato's doctrine, this tendency is explicable because the 
individual is a temporary and accidental participation in an ideal 
archetype of humanity, which is one and the same for all men, 
and thus alone truly real. Even in the philosophy of Aristotle, 
where at least the individual man is credited with subsistence, a 
subtler but equally fundamental priority of the collective over the 
individual is found. There, the multiplicity of individuals is a 
mere substitute for the unity of the species: in the absence of a 
subsisting Humanity, a chain of subsisting but corruptible in-
dividuals are continually generated in order to assure the per-
manence of the non-subsisting species. 1 9 8 
The Christian conception of the created, conserved, redeem-
ed, and ultimately indestructible human individual, although ob-
viously incompatible with pagan anthropologies, was not, 
however, immediately accompanied by a satisfactory philosophical 
explanation. Gilson locates the arrival of this support in the 
delicate changes to which St. Thomas subjected Aristotelian 
speculation about the principle of individuation in man, even as 
he assumed this speculation in its grand outines as his own. 1 9 9 
Both Aristotle and St. Thomas refuse to place the principle 
of individuation in the form, for if each human individual possess-
ed a form with an individual difference, each human individual 
would become a species unto itself. 2 0 0 Thus St. Thomas along 
with Aristotle can posit formal distinctions that separate one 
species from another, and material distinctions by which one in-
dividual within a species is individuated from another. As material 
300 WILLIAM SHAUGHNESSY 
is inferior to form as potency is to act, the material individual is, 
in the general case, subordinate to the collective or species. 2 0 1 
Matter is the principle which makes individuation possible, 
not as prime matter (since pure potency cannot individuate 
anything), but by the quantity invested in it by virtue of the form. 
Thus, it can be said that matter causes individuation, but only along 
with the intervention of the form which, in conferring actuality 
upon the matter, invests it with quantity, and singularizes it. 
This presents no particular problems for plants and animals, 
but Gilson pinpoints the apparent dilemma if this explanation 
were to be used for man without further refinement: 
It goes...against the grain to have to admit... that what 
makes each one of us precisely himself, and endows our 
personality-this unique and proper character that we look 
on so complacently and protect with such jealousy... 
should be, not the spiritual element in our nature, but 
the accidental fact that the portion of matter that goes to 
make up my body is not the port ion al lotted to 
yours . 2 0 2 
The dilemma is only apparent, however, because the 
Thomist doctrine of individuation does not attempt to explain the 
origin of man's dignity or even his originality; but only his in-
dividuation. The key difference between plants and animals on the 
one hand, and men on the other, lies in the relation of the form 
to the matter it informs; in all three cases the forms confer ac-
tuality on the matter, but only in the case of man the form also 
confers substantiality upon the composite. The form of man is 
not only a substantial form but also a subsisting principle of 
operations proper to itself as a form. Thus the act of being of the 
composite man is not different than the act of being of his 
soul . 2 0 3 It was precisely the substantial character of man's soul to 
which Aristotle did not advert, claims Gilson. 2 0 4 
This inadvertence vexes Aristotle in his attempt to explain 
how the intellect, a principle whose operations are found to be in-
dependent of the body, is related to that body. Without a clear 
sense of the difference between the human soul and other substan-
tial forms, he is constrained to preserve the substantial unity of 
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the human individual only at the cost of detaching the intellect 
from the possession of that individual. 2 0 5 
St. Thomas did not have to make this painful choice bet-
ween hylemorphic anthropology and the substantiality of man's 
soul. For him, man's soul is a form and a substance, and precisely 
its formality lies at the basis of its substantiality. Man is a com-
plex substance who owes his substantiality to only one of its two 
constitutive principles. 2 0 6 
This has important consequences for individuation. Even if 
the form of man does not subsist (initially) as an individual, 
nonetheless it is in virtue of this form (as opposed to the com-
posite) that substance pertains to the individual. In other words, 
it is matter that individualizes the form, but once individualized, 
it is the form which is individual. In plants and brute animals, it 
is the -form qua form that is individualized, and thus the form 
perishes upon its separation from matter. In men, it is the form 
qua substantial that is individualized, and thus the form can sur-
vive its separation from the matter which it informs. 2 0 7 
The operation of the intellect, so problematic for Aristotle, 
is now seen to be exactly that which brings us to a knowledge 
of the substantiality of the soul in St. Thomas. As Gilson 
observes: 
...every distinct operation supposes a distinct substance. It 
is only in fact by their operations that substances are 
known and conversely, operations are not to be explained 
except by substances... 
...If then there are acts of intellectual cognition, their 
cause could lie in no abstract principle such as thought in 
general, but of necessity in some concrete principle, real, 
and consequently subsisting in a determinate nature. In a 
word, wherever there are acts of thought there are think-
ing substances. 2 0 8 
All that remains is to annex the proofs that the soul is im-
mortal (already found in Plato) to the insight that the soul is 
substantial. As an incorruptible substance, the human individual is 
as permanent as the human species, and thus falls as equally 
within the chief intention of nature as the species. 2 0 9 
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An individual of this sort, thus distinguished from plants 
and animals, merits its own terminology. It is called a person, and 
its traditional definition, an individual substance of a rational 
nature, 110 puts into relief the aforementioned properties of sub-
sistence and rationality. 
Thus Gilson is able to attribute to medieval speculation the 
attainment of the philosophically justified concept of person with 
«all the dignity of a permanent being, indestructible, distinct from 
every other in his very permanence, and an original source of ra-
tional activity responsibly deciding his own future destiny.* 2 1 1 
He claims that this definition of person inspired the whole Middle 
Ages, and weighed heavily even in the development of Kantian 
philosophy and modern ethics. 2 1 2 Nonetheless, he admits that the 
very sublimity of this concept prevented the Medievals from pro-
perly exploiting it in the study of man. How so? 
A person, as a rational subsisting individual, excels all else in 
nature, especially since nothing prevents its application to God 
itself. This appl icat ion was performed by the Medieval 
philosophers with gusto, as Gilson relates. 2 1 3 
What speculation do the scholastics offer, on the other hand, 
regarding man as a person? It seems that in the moment of an im-
mensely important discovery, Medieval thought froze in its tracks 
and refused to embark upon the speculative pathway it had open-
ed. Gilson muses: 
To be a person is to participate in one of the highest ex-
cellences of the divine being. But then it seems, when 
that is said, all is said. Not a word throughout the whole 
of medieval moral philosophy on what the medievals 
themselves held to be highest in man and therefore in all 
nature. 2 1 4 
Gilson will complete this picture by contending that the 
absence of the person in medieval speculation about man is more 
apparent than real; that despite the lack of explicit thematization, 
the concept of the person vivifies this era's thought about man as 
well as divinity. 2 1 5 At the moment, let us return to Lonergan to 
see how his thought on the subject compares to this concept of 
person. 
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3. Subject and Person 
This brief sal ly, following Gilson, into classical and 
scholastic metaphysics can serve to illustrate some of the points 
Lonergan makes and provide an alternative reading to other posi-
tions he takes. Both philosophers recognize the inability of the 
philosophies of antiquity to adequately justify the intuitively ob-
vious distinction between man and other material creatures; both 
hold that scholastic philosophy overcame this obstacle most clear-
ly in the thought of Aquinas. 
Furthermore, both Gilson and Lonergan agree that the ad-
vance made by medieval thought requires an anthropological 
thematization, since the most explicit medieval statements about 
that which constitutes man in his originality occur in the context 
of theology or theodicy. 2 1 6 
Both philosophers also agree that large portions of modern 
philosophy are heirs of this medieval advance, and that the desired 
thematization of the the medieval experience of man would 
precede an intelligent incorporation and rejection of the offerings 
of modern philosophy. 2 1 7 Indeed, the two philosophers seem to 
agree in all respects except over what the exact nature of the 
medieval or Thomist 2 1 8 gain was, and what procedure we might 
follow to continue drawing fruit from it. First, we will take a 
brief look at Gilson's point of view. 
Aquinas, in the light of Christian Revelation, had an even 
keener sense of the hierarchy or analogy of being than Aristotle 
that pushed him to distinguish more sharply between man and 
animals, and between spiritual substances and pure Act. These 
sharper distinctions were made possible by the grounding of this 
hierarchy in the concept of being itself, and an unlimited Being 
which confers being on all else through creation. The concept of 
person marks off the precise point in which man enters into this 
hierarchy. Gilson suggests and undertakes a deepening of our 
knowledge of man both by investigating the foundation of the en-
tire hierarchy (the metaphysics of being) and the metaphysical 
concept of person as it relates to man and his action. 
One might ask at this point: if the inclusion of man in a 
universal hierarchy of being tended to obscure the differences bet-
ween man and lower forms of life before the evolution of this 
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concept of person, and directed attention to forms of life higher 
than man after this evolution reached a term, might it not be 
preferable to set aside the metaphysical approach altogether? 
Lonergan's subject appears to be just such an approach. Star-
ting with his interpretation of the history of philosophy, he con-
siders that despite the extraordinary grasp of the facts of con-
sciousness possessed by Aristotle, St. Augustine, and St. Thomas, 
it remains that «...they did not work out systematically the notion 
of the subject. They did not integrate this systematic notion with 
the rest of their philosophic and psychological doctrine.* 2" 
Lonergan explains on various occasions the consequences this 
neglect will have; for instance, in Verbum he points out that 
without advertence to the subject, the medievals could not lay the 
groundwork for the contemporary distinctions between nature and 
spirit and between the natural and human sciences. 2 2 0 
A more elaborate discussion of these consequences is con-
tained in one of Lonergan's lectures. The neglect of the subject as 
leads to the anti-historical immobilism and excessive abstractness 
of conceptualism, 2 2 1 which in turn leads, via a simplistic «picture 
thinking* model of knowing, to immanentism. 2 2 2 Both concep-
tualism and immanentism, he continues, by their neglect or distor-
tion of the subject, are incapable of adequately explaining the key 
role of the actually existing subject of making himself what he is 
to be, and even such complementary categories such as intellect-
will, or speculative-practical intellect, or theory-praxis, share in the 
same difficulty (even if the latter three pairs at least permit some 
recognition of the reflexive self-constituting element of moral 
l iving). 2 2 3 
The imperfection of the grasp of the self-constituting moral 
being that stems from ignoring the subject can create a backlash 
of a false theory of subjectivity. This counterfeit theory of the 
subject brushes aside the traditional questions of cognitional 
theory, epistemology, and metaphysics without realizing that in 
the concreteness of the existential subject, these questions not only 
do not vanish, but present themselves wi th even greater 
urgency. 2 2 4 
Having noted these historical considerations of Lonergan we 
are in a better position to appreciate his proposed change in 
method: if substances are known only by acts, as Gilson contends, 
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instead of fine-tuning a metaphysical method, why not attend im-
mediately to those acts of man, his conscious operations, which 
are available to each and every man whatsoever without media-
tion? This change in method serves notice that Lonergan's subject 
differs from the concept of person. 225 
The Thomist person is a perfecting of the metaphysical 
method of Aristotle; it is metaphysical because an individual 
substance of a rational nature embraces two other metaphysical 
concepts-substance and nature. Since neither of the two are given 
in consciousness, it comes as no surprise that at times Lonergan 
formulates a contrast not between subject and 5 0 « / , but rather bet-
ween subject and substance: 
...The first distinction is between substance and subject. 
When one is sound asleep one is actually a substance and 
only potentially a subject. 2 2 6 
This confirms the impossibility of the subject being taken as 
the person. Note that a human is in act even if he is not a sub-
ject, i.e., subject does not have a monopoly on act. However, to 
be a subject as Lonergan understands it, one must at least be 
dreaming, i.e. performing the minimal conscious operation. 
4. The Subject Defined 
We are now in a position to better understand Lonergan's 
descriptions of the subject. His most concise description simply 
states: «A subject is a conscious person.* 2 2 7 
Clearly, for Lonergan, this does not serve as a definition, for 
were that so, the subject would be a metaphysical concept, as it 
would include the concept of the person. Lonergan does not mean 
this. Nonetheless, it serves as a handy distinction-the subject is 
not a synonym for the person; it is the conscious person qua con-
scious, i.e. it is the agent of conscious acts, the acting person, but 
only inasmuch as the acts are conscious: 
Substance prescinds from the difference between the opa-
que being that is merely substance and the luminous be-
ing that is conscious. Subject denotes the luminous 
being. 2 2 8 
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Elsewhere Lonergan notes that the subject is «the principium 
quod of acts of sense or intellect.* 2 2 9 This latter statement serves 
better as a definition, for as Lonergan states, the notion of subject 
«cannot be reached merely by combining other better known con-
cepts. It can only be reached by directing one's attention to the 
facts and to understanding them correctly.* 2 3 0 The facts to which 
he refers are conscious acts to which all have immediate access. 
When addressing a scholastic audience he can cast his explanation 
of the subject in terms of the Aristotelian-Thomist doctrine of the 
identity in act of the subject and object: 
In so far as there is in man a sensibile actu, there is by 
that very act a sensus actu and a subiectum actu, in so far 
as there is an intelligibile actu there is by that very act an 
intellectus actu and a subiectum actu Finally, the subiectum 
actu is the principium quod of the act . 2 3 1 
When Lonergan goes about explaining the subject in con-
temporary terminology, he refers to it simply as the experienced 
unity underlying conscious acts: 
What do I mean by T? The answer is difficult to for-
mulate but...in some obscure fashion I know very well 
what it means without formulation... T has a rudimen-
tary meaning from consciousness and it envisages neither 
the multiplicity nor the diversity of contents and con-
scious acts but rather the unity that goes along with 
them. 2 3 2 
Let us briefly note four important considerations about his 
subject. Firstly, Lonergan's approach to the subject is noteworthy 
in its differences from other contemporary existential philosophers. 
These authors would easily accept his notion of the subject would, 
but refuse to admit that the subject could be constrained or con-
nected with a person, since the latter would involve acknowledg-
ing the existence of substance, an indistinct notion in their opinion, 
and nature, a violation of the incommunicability of the autonomous 
subject. 2 3 3 Lonergan, however, has no qualms about admitting 
both manners of studying man: 
I do not mean that the metaphysical notion of the soul 
and its properties is to be dropped... but I urge the 
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necessity of a self-appropriation of the subject, of coming to 
know at first-hand oneself and one's own operations... 2 3 4 
Thus, while Lonergan has no objection to a metaphysical ap-
proach, it should not be a first philosophy as he sees it, since the 
subject is prior to any subsequent metaphysical elaboration: 
...consciousness does not reveal a prime substance, it reveals 
a psychological subject that subsequently may be subsum-
ed, and subsumed correctly, under the category of prime 
substance. 2 3 5 
Secondly, neither can it be said that Lonergan's attitude toward 
the subject is is pacifically shared among other Thomist philosophers, 
even those who strive to incorporate modern theories of subjec-
tivity to the extent possible. In one such philosopher, Millan-Puelles, 
the distinction between subject and person is one of connotation 
rather than denotation. 
The Spanish philosopher describes a series of data-e.g. the in-
termittency of consciousness due to sleep or injury, and its coming-
into-being in time-as indicative of the «inadequacy» or dependence 
of consciousness on natural determinations other than itself. 2 3 6 The 
inadequacy of consciousness indicates that the subject resides in a 
nature, 2 3 7 and receives some determinations independently of con-
scious acts. 2 3 8 Thus he can state: 
...the «1» does not include the actual exercise of the con-
sciousness... Without the capacity to exercise consciousness, 
the «1» is unconceivable. But this capacity by which the 
«1» is radically defined is not confused with the actual ex-
ercise of the consciousness... Subjectivity is not con-
sciousness, but rather a subject radically apt for con-
sciousness. Only in this way can the solidarity of the 
cessation of consciousness with the consciousness of this 
cessation be accounted for, as an occurrence relative to an 
identical and individual subject. 2 3 9 
This is in contrast to Lonergan's subject, which disappears 
with the disappearance of consciousness. Further along in his 
development, Millan-Puelles clearly states: 
It is not correct to affirm that subjectivity is of such a 
character that it has to perceive itself or perceive the world, 
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if this co-perception is taken for granted or proposed as 
a determination indispensable for the subjectivity to be 
what it is. The substrate of all perception is, in its 
essence, a subject capable of perceiving. Clearly we would 
not know this if acts of perception never occurred. But 
that which is necessary for subjectivity to appear in some 
way to itself is one thing, and that which is required for 
it simply to be, is another. 2 4 0 
For both these philosophers, consciousness is not a self-
sufficient entity, but an aspect of acts of a subject. In this respect, 
it is an abstraction to speak of acts as conscious, since con-
sciousness pertains to the subject, and through the subject to its 
acts. However, the difference between the two authors is clear-a 
subject for Millan-Puelles is what is capable of being conscious, a 
subject for Lonergan is what is conscious. 
Thirdly, the limitations of human consciousness, coupled 
with the distinction between Lonergan's subject and the traditional 
person, suggest that the subject is a partial view of man. Is it, 
then, an abstraction? 
The person as previously defined is not an abstraction, for 
in saying that it is an individual substance we refer to the sup-
positum, which is the concrete individual whole that acts through 
a specific nature, rational in this instance. Thus the suppositum ex-
cludes neither the essence nor the act of being that actualizes it, 
nor any accident that it may happen to possess. 2 4 1 
The subject on the other hand, might seem to be an abstrac-
tion, for it is not a complete a description of man as the person. 
As «conscious person* it cannot include unconscious states; as an 
experienced unity underlying conscious acts, it cannot account for 
what is not experienced in consciousness but nonetheless pertains 
to the man. Lonergan, however, emphatically insists that his sub-
ject is not an abstraction: 
Of the human substance it is true that human nature is 
always the same; a man is a man whether he is awake or 
asleep, young or old, sane or crazy, sober or drunk, a 
genius or a moron, a saint or a sinner. From the view-
point of substance, those differences are merely accidental. 
But they are not accidental to the subject, for the subject 
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¿5 not an abstraction; he is a concrete reality, all of him, 
a being in the luminousness of being. 2 4 2 
As we understand him, Lonergan is saying that what is 
abstracted is abstracted from what is given, what is given is given 
in consciousness, whereby the subject as the subject precisely of 
consciousness prescinds from nothing that is within consciousness. 
Since what is abstract is a selection made from what is presented 
in consciousness, and the subject is the unity of all conscious acts 
experienced, the subject is not abstract. 
Thus, consciousness reveals a subject which will turn out to 
be a psychological manifestation of a substance that is inferred to 
undergo the non-conscious modes indicated by Millan Puelles. 
Those non-conscious determinations result from posterior scientific 
knowledge of the soul, and in some way, depend on abstraction 
to be known, even if the suppositum that includes them is not 
abstractly predicated What is given in consciousness is the 
psychological manifestation or subject, and not the suppositum. 
The person, although a complete view of man since it sup-
poses both a nature and the existence of that nature in a sup-
positum, in some way depends on abstraction since before 
something is known as an individual instance of a nature, one 
must know the universal nature, which is abstract. The subject, 
on the contrary, although a concrete whole of what is given in 
consciousness, is only a partial consideration of man. It does not 
depend on abstraction since it is operative prior to the abstraction 
of scientific knowledge of the soul. Thus we should expect to find 
Lonergan at times using the subject along with some other princi-
ple to give a complete explanation of man. Although not fre-
quent, this does occur. 2 4 3 
Fourthly, the usage of subject peculiar to Lonergan has im-
portant consequences for understanding his thought. For instance, 
many scholastic philosophers would claim that we never obtain 
our subjectivity as such, but only reducing it to an object. This 
would at first sight appear to contradict Lonergan, who claims 
that the subject is experienced in any conscious act, even if it 
later can and should objectified for further study. 
If however, one realizes that Lonergan is referring to the 
subject as a psychological operator unifying conscious acts, and not 
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as a suppositum, there is at least a possibility of reconciling the 
two positions since Lonergan would agree that the suppositum is 
not given in consciousness, and the other philosophers would 
agree that the the unity of conscious acts is experienced. At this 
moment, the concern is not to settle the problem of how the in-
tentional i ty analysis and metaphysical approach are to be 
employed relative to one another, but to indicate the potential for 
confusion if one does not firmly keep in mind that Lonergan's 
subject is not a suppositum. 
B. The Structuring of the Subject 
Lonergan's proposed cognitional process is unanimously dubb-
ed a dynamic structure by commentators. We have seen why it is a 
structure: first, an increment of properly human knowledge is only 
reached at the terminal point of a process of three levels. Secondly, 
the three levels are defined reciprocally, by their relation to each 
other, for the transcendental object of each level in some way is 
required for the functioning of the subsequent level. Lastly, further 
increments of knowledge are not obtained by new processes, but by 
a recurrence of the same process under different circumstances. 
We have yet to consider the dynamic aspect, to which we 
shall attend in the present section. In the first sub-section we will 
look at the nature of this dynamism and deny that it is volun-
taristic. Secondly, we shall distinguish it from the agent intellect 
and identify it with the scholastic intellectual light. Thirdly, we 
shall show that the intellectual dynamism in Lonergan's work 
gradually evolves into a general radical intending that includes 
man's moral dimension. Lastly, we will review Lonergan's subject 
in light of the precisions made about its structuring principle. 
1. Intellectual Dynamism (The Desire to Know) 
The dynamism of knowledge can be attributed to two fac-
tors. First, the whole that is knowing is composed of activities: 
The parts of a whole may be things, bricks, timbers, 
glass, rubber, chrome. But the parts may also be activities, 
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as in a song, a dance, a chorus, a symphony, a drama. 
Such a whole is dynamic materially. 2 4 4 
Such a material dynamism does not explain, however, how 
one level of cognitional subjectivity gives way to the next level, 
which in turn presupposes the previous level. Lonergan explains: 
But dynamism may not be restricted to the parts. The 
whole itself may be self-assembling, self-constituting; then 
it is formally dynamic. 2 4 5 
This amounts to saying that knowledge develops under the 
sway of an immanent active principle. This principle appears in 
the first pages of Insight and dominates the entire book. 2 4 6 This 
principle is variously labeled «a tension,* «a desire to understand,* 
«the primordial 'Why?',* «alertness of mind,» intellectual curiosi-
ty,* «the spirit of inquiry,* «active intelligence,* «the drive to 
know,* «the pure question,* and «the wonder which Aristotle 
claimed to be the beginning of all science and philosophy.* 2 4 7 A 
more precise definition by G. Sala reads: 
...the dynamism, intelligently and rationally conscious, 
which lies at the source of the cognitional process and 
penetrates it throughout, setting up principles normative 
of the different phases of the structure in which it is 
realized. 2 4 8 
There is a certain looseness at times in Lonergan's ter-
minology that merits scrutiny. One complaint is that the use of 
«desire» implies an influence of the will, and thus is a somewhat 
turbid description of an intellectual intention. Also of concern is 
the inexact use of «active intelligence* as a synonym for this 
drive, since for Lonergan «active intelligence* in all probability 
refers to the agent intellect. 2 4 9 
Let us first look at what Lonergan means by «desire.» A 
constitutive desire to know that is part of the will would pose 
problems for many Thomists since it recalls the irrationalism of 
the voluntaristic philosophies of the 19th century. Indeed, desire 
is typically given as one of the types of act in the w i l l . 2 5 0 
However, it would seem to be a natural intention that directs a 
potency to its proper object that Lonergan has in mind. Thus, he 
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labels the orientation of the fetal eye toward seeing as an un-
conscious desire, hunger as an empirically conscious desire, and 
the desire to know as an intelligently and rationally conscious 
desire. 2 5 1 
This role serves notice that the «desire» of Lonergan's desire 
to know is not an act of the will, i.e., an elicited and thus a-
posteriori appetite. The ambiguity of terminology is regrettable, 
but does not seem to have originated with Lonergan; it is 
traceable to the famous opening of Aristotle's Metaphysics. 252 
In St. Thomas, the intellect moves the will primarily and of 
itself, but the will only moves the intellect somewhat accidentally, 
inasmuch as it is moved by an object apprehended as good, and 
the act of understanding itself can be the object apprehended as 
good. 2 5 3 This act of the will is called a «desire to understand* by 
Aquinas, but it is important to realize that this is not the same 
as Lonergan's desire to know, for here the will's desire to unders-
tand depends on intellectual knowledge, i.e. the will would not 
desire to know unless the intellect first apprehended the act of 
understanding as a good. 2 5 4 
Now in Insight, the desire to know acts constitutively in a 
natural or a-priori manner before the act of understanding occurs, 
and a-fortiori before the will as an elicited appetite desires to 
understand. Thus, Lonergan's desire to know is not the elicited 
actuation of the will: 
«...the desire to know is not...a consequence of of intellec-
tual knowledge, as are deliberation and choice.* 2 5 5 
It seems to us that on a metaphysical level the desire to 
know of Lonergan is fully compatible with the solution of St. 
Thomas on the relation of the will and intellect. The will can 
move the intellect to act, but it is not constitutive of the intellec-
tual life, and its moving of the intellect is posterior to the con-
stitution of the intellectual activity on the three levels of cognitive 
subjectivity. Lonergan is not unaware of the aforementioned in-
terplay between the intellect and will which gives rise to an 
elicited desire to understand on the part of the will, for he does 
not deny that the will can intervene as agent for better or worse 
in the unfolding of the dynamic orientation of man's intellect. 2 5 6 
Nonetheless the desire to know is prior to this mutual concourse. 
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However, it should be noted that unlike Lonergan, Aquinas 
is relating two faculties, the intellect and the will. The intellect 
moves the will as an end and the will moves the intellect as an 
agent. Since the agent acts for an end, the intellect moving the 
will is superior to the will moving the intellect. 2 5 7 Lonergan con-
tends that the conscious operations which comprise knowing and 
doing are, in their very constitution, intentional. That is, they are 
intrinsically objective, and the object in this sense acts as an end 
which is intended. Thus the interactions of two potencies is not 
integral to his intentionality centered scheme; the agency is ex-
plained by one level of intentionality sublating another, and the 
finality by the dynamism constitutive of the levels themselves. 
Now that we have clarified what «desire» in the desire to 
know does and does not mean, let us turn to the agent intellect 
and intellectual light. 
2. Agent Intellect and Intellectual Light 
An internal analysis of Verbum and Insight reveals that in 
scholastic terms it is intellectual light and not agent intellect that 
Lonergan seeks to present in his writings as the structuring princi-
ple of the subject. This will become clearer if we briefly consider 
the agent intellect. 
Aristotle rightly observed that since we first understand in 
potency and only later in act, there must be an active as well as 
a passive principle of our understanding. 2 5 8 Once it is denied 
that essences of material things exist in separated Platonic Ideas, 
one's cognitional theory must explain the passage of material 
things from potential to actual (immaterial) inte l l ig ibi l i ty . 2 5 9 
Aquinas, opposing the Averroists, pointed out that our agent in-
tellect is an immanent and individual possession of each of us, 
since the functions assigned to it by Aristotle are capable of being 
performed by the intellectual light connatural to u s . 2 6 0 
However it is not the case that we experience the agent in-
tellect. We experience acts within us that are explained by the 
agent intellect. Thus, when Aquinas takes advantage of Aristotle's 
comparison of agent intellect to l ight, 2 6 1 he ascribes the action of 
the agent intellect to the light of our soul. 2 6 2 Since Aquinas 
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must recur to empirical self knowledge to argue in favor of the 
agent intellect as a power of the individual soul, it is not the 
agent intellect that is experienced. 2 6 3 
Plainly, Aquinas is placing the agent intellect as the on-
tological ground of intellectual light. Intellectual light can be ex-
perienced in consciousness, while the agent intellect qua agent in-
tellect cannot. The agent intellect is a potency, and even if it is 
perpetually in act, what is experienced are its acts. The potency 
itself is known by a investigation that proceeds from acts to their 
causal explanations in potencies, and this remains so even if one 
parts from the data of consciousness. 2 6 4 
Let us move on to Verbum's intellectual light and Insight's 
desire to know. In Insight, intellectual light is not usually called 
intellectual light, although on one occasion, it is dubbed the 
«dynamic orientation of man's intelligent and rational con-
sciousness.* 2 6 5 This isolated but clear indication is supported by 
various parallel texts. 
In Verbum Lonergan tells us that intellectual light is a pure 
quality of acts of understanding, although we never experience it 
in its pure form. 2 6 6 In Insight the concomitant nature of the ap-
pearance of the desire to know would seem to be responsible for 
Lonergan's insistence that the human subject functions in a 
curious mix of patterns of experience of which the intellectual 
pattern (in which the desire to know is dominant) is only a small 
but important part . 2 6 7 
In Verbum, the role of intellectual light in the manifestation 
of first principles 2 6 8 and in the self-grasp of one's transcendence-
in-immanence in judgment 2 6 9 would seem to be only an instance 
of a more general role-intellectual light is the «principle of in-
quiry and discourse* that is that unfolds on the various operation 
and levels; thus it is «constitutive of our power of understan-
ding.* 2 7 0 Similarly, Insight's desire to know is prior to and con-
stitutive of our intellectual power, and in this facet is most clearly 
identifiable with intellectual l ight. 2 7 1 
Intellectual light in Verbum possesses an «inner nisus 
towards the infinite* 2 7 2 which is experienced in consciousness, 
and when reflected upon, provides the precise content of the 
reflective understanding that grasps the proportion of our minds 
to reality. 2 7 3 
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This opening towards the infinite is also present in Insight's 
desire to know, which Lonergan labels «unrestricted.» 2 7 4 It is the 
immanent source of transcendence in man, whether this be 
transcendence to an object proportionate to his intellect or to one 
that is beyond i t . 2 7 5 
Faced with these parallels, we conclude that the desire to 
know in Insight is Lonergan's attempt to explain Thomist intellec-
tual light to the general philosophical public. In Verhum, it is in 
his interest to maintain Aquinas' terminology, 2 7 6 but this does 
not hold in Insight. 
3. Radical Intending 
The references Lonergan makes to the «inner nisus toward 
the infinite,* and unrestricted desire* of intellectual light raise a 
serious question. Does the pure desire to know contain an urge 
toward the supernatural? Is it a desire to know God? Is it a desire 
for that intellectual vision of God that St. Thomas insisted was 
the ultimate end and happiness for man? Does it contain 
theological or metaphysical presuppositions that would com-
promise its status as a purely psychological circumstance that is 
directly accessible in consciousness?2 7 7 
What is at stake is the legitimacy of Lonergan's basic 
position-if he were to claim that we know God instinctively as 
the heuristic object of our natural striving, his cognitional theory 
would be little more than a thinly disguised theologism or on-
tologism, or perhaps an expansion from the moral to the cogni-
tional ambit of Kant's postulated God. 
We cannot include in the present study the detailed 
documentation necessary to support our contention that Lonergan 
refuses to take the foreknowledge of our own subjective 
dynamism as a supernatural phenomenon or direct knowlege of 
God. 2 7 8 It will be sufficient to note that Lonergan consistently 
rejects the merger of theological and transcendental method, in-
sisting that transcendental method only provides an an-
thropological component of the method of theology. 2 7 9 Other 
transcendental Thomists such as Karl Rahner insist that the study 
of theology is essentially a study of the a-priori conditions of 
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possibility of listening to a divine Revelation, hence even atheists 
can be termed anonymous Christians since their free cognitive and 
moral operation activates these possibilities. 2 8 0 
Lonergan does not deny that our subjective dynamism plays 
an important role in the supernatural life, for it is by its wonder 
that we enter the horizon in which questions about God make 
sense. Nonetheless, a horizon is not a proof, and Lonergan opines 
that our intentionality is not an experience of God, but rather an 
experience that can be used in a proof by which we can come to 
the knowledge of His existence. 2 8 1 The structuring principle of 
the subject, then, is a natural desire with natural transcendent ob-
jectives. The conscious acts by which we employ this dynamism 
may constitute men as anonymous metaphysicians, 2 8 2 but not 
anonymous Christians. 
Although Insight's subject-based metaphysics does not include 
a theological hermeneutic as the basis of a transcendental an-
thropology, one may observe a certain generalization of inten-
tionality that occurs in Lonergan's post-Insight works. This 
generalization will remove the subjective dynamism from a faculty 
psychology that involves such differences as «intellect» and «will» 
and situate it entirely in the seat of an intentionality analysis. 
Thus, the dynamism can no longer be confined to the intellect; 
and it is more proper to refer to it as an articulated radical inten-
ding rather than an «intellectual» dynamism. 
This can be approached through Lonergan's discussions of 
the a-priori in conscious human acts. He decries an excessive at-
tention in cognitional theory to the a-priori in the Kant's sense 
of independence from all experience. Such a misplaced concern is 
born of the assumption that knowledge is essentially intuition and 
thus either a confrontation with the extra-subjective or a 
knowledge of the a-priori. 
For Lonergan, knowledge is essentially identity of the 
knower and the known instead of confrontation. The important 
distinction is between which elements are natural to the subject 
and which must be acquired, but neither of these arises to con-
sciousness apart from experience since what we have from nature 
is only potential knowledge. 2 8 3 The activation of this potential is 
for Lonergan a natural and radical conscious intending provoked 
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and determined by experience. Intentionality refers to the fact that 
human cognitional acts are related to experience, i.e., have con-
tents and are objective: 
But what does a radical or pure intending intend? The 
unknown. How can the unknown be said to be intended if it is 
truly unknown? This is precisely the trademark of intending, as 
Lonergan points out: 
Objects are what are intended in questioning. What is 
this intending? It is neither ignorance nor knowledge. It 
is conscious movement away from ignorance and toward 
knowledge. 2 8 4 
By the very fact that the unknown is a content of a hum-
pean operation, the unknown is intended. An unknown qua con-
tent of a cognitional level is, for Lonergan, a transcendental. The 
intending varies on each level while remaining the same radical in-
tending, as a chameleon changes appearance to adapt to various 
ambients while remaining the same chameleon. The different 
transcendentals express this change in accordance with the specific 
virtuality of type of intending appropriate to each level: 
...besides their distinction and their functional in-
terdependence, the levels of consciousness are united by 
the unfolding of a single transcendental intending of 
plural, interchangeable objectives. These objectives are ap-
proximately the Scholastic transcendentals, ens, unum, 
verum, bonum, and they are interchangeable in the sense 
of mutual predication, of convertuntur. 2* 5 
The desire to know is an implicit theory of transcendentals 
since the radical intending manifests itself in various acts that are 
distinguished by their objects, which are the transcendentals. The 
radical intending in its various manifestations comprises the 
transcendental notions operative within us. These conscious inten-
tions or notions can later be objectified in transcendental con-
cepts, but as operative they are notions and not concepts. The 
transcendental concepts, then, are the unknowns sought by 
various operations of each level. 
Now, if in Insight the desire to know increasingly ap-
proaches a radical intending, the consummation of the transforma-
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tion is deferred to posterior works. There, the pure desire 
broadens from a merely cognitive notion to a moral and even 
religious phenomenon. In the introduction to a collection of 
Lonergan's essays, a close collaborator reports: 
At an institutc. in 1971...Lonergan was asked whether, 
just as he had spoken of a pure detached desire to know 
in Insight, he would now be willing to identify it with a 
pure detached desire for value. He answered ye s . 2 8 6 
This change of approach is obvious in Lonergan's articles of 
the 1960's and 70's: 
In Insight, thé good was the intelligent and reasonable. In 
Method [of Theology] the good is a distinct notion. It is in-
tended in questions for deliberation... 2 8 7 
...the intention of the intelligible, the true, the real, 
becomes also the intention of the good, the question of 
value, of what is worthwhile, when the already acting 
subject confronts his world and adverts to his own acting 
in i t . 2 8 8 
These articles indicate a post-cognitional level of subjectivity 
that responds to the same radical intending, but now manifesting 
itself in a moral stage of evaluation-a conscious intending of what 
is good or worthwhile that sublates the previous cognitional levels 
and marks an entrance into the free and responsible fourth level 
of subjectivity. The degree of self-transcendence is progressively 
augmented on each succeeding level. 
4. The Subject Revisited 
We are now in a position to relate the radical intending to 
Lonergan's subject. Indeed they are intimately related. Radical 
conscious intending constitutes a delineated field of study that is 
the subject; an analysis of our radical intending is the study of 
transcendental notions, and a theory of transcendental notions is 
the structure of subjectivity. 
The role of the pure desire in constituting the subject will 
allow a further refinement in our previous observation that the 
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subject is inextricably linked to act. It makes it clear that the sub-
ject is neither the possible intellect, nor the agent intellect, nor 
both of them together, for both the possible intellect and agent 
intellect are potencies, and the existence of potencies is known by 
a metaphysical investigation (see Figure 10) and not by attention 
to radical intending. 2 8 9 
soul — potency ~*— habit — acts — objects 
Figure 10: Metaphysical Study of Man 
Lonergan's subject, in our opinion, bears more resemblance 
to the intellectus in actu that Aquinas at times contrasts with the 
intellectus agens.  290 This «intellect-in-act» is not some potency 
over and above the agent and possible intellect, but simply 
designates the combined activities of the agent and possible in-
tellects in the act of understanding. However, even here it is not 
clear that the intellect-in-act is limited only to acts accessible in 
consciousness, as would be required of Lonergan's subject. 
Lonergan's subject manifests both the agent and possible intellect, 
but neither of them entirely—only the parts of each that can sur-
face in consciousness. The distinction between metaphysical in-
vestigation to discover a potency and the intentionality analysis 
that discovers the subject is diagrammed in Figure 11. 
subjectivity 
(four level structure) 
11 
conscious 
soul ~«— potency — habit — acts — objects 
t 
intellectual light 
(pure desire to know) 
Figure 11: Intentionality Analysis vs. Metaphysical Psychology 
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This perhaps will serve to clarify that the subject is not a 
modern attempt to describe the agent intellect. This confusion can 
arise because the subject is a principle of acts and not apart from 
them, and the agent intellect is a potency that is ever in act. 
Nonetheless, although the actuality of the agent intellect will in-
evitably contribute to the constitution of the subject in the ver-
tical procedure, as a potency it is known by a metaphysical in-
vestigation represented by the horizontal procedure. 2 9 1 
Figure 11 also shows why Lonergan refers to the subject as 
luminous, it is the part of humanity constituted by intellectual 
light. As the part of man constituted by the intending of 
transcendentals, it can be called the transcendental ego; Lonergan 
tends to avoid the term but on occasion uses i t . 2 9 2 
To conclude this discussion of the desire to know and the 
subject that it constitutes, the subject as pictured in the above 
diagrams portends neither a rejection of a metaphysical approach 
in general, nor an abandonment of the nature of man as a principle 
of operations. However, the foundation laid so far will heavily con-
dition any such undertaking, for the paradigm for metaphysics will 
be precisely the subject, and the paradigm for the emergence of 
natures in the universe will be the emergent radical intending in 
man. This paradigmatic role of the subject explains why Lonergan, 
although never ruling out a metaphysical approach, increasingly 
favors an intentionality analysis of the subject as a basis of method. 
The use of the subject as a paradigm of nature is an impor-
tant feature to be kept in mind in comparing Lonergan with 
other authors. It clearly signals a limitation of the subject, since 
nature is a determinate mode of being and operation, and deter-
mination is of potency and not of act. Thus the subject is not the 
self-sufficient self-consciousness of idealists, nor could it be, since 
it is constituted by a striving, and what must strive is imperfect. 
Also excluded is the sharp distinction of man into realms of 
nature and person, despite a family resemblance of Lonergan's 
subject to K. Rahner's «person.» 2 9 3 This feature also distinguishes 
Lonergan from Coreth, who pays less attention to the ways in 
which man's radical intending can be thwarted, thus leaving the 
distinction between the subject and the man ambiguous. 2 9 4 
Finally, it preserves in some way a fundamental insight of 
Millan-Puelles: that subjectivity is «reiforme», in the form of a 
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nature or thing. Millan-Puelles pounces on homely but crucial 
facts of consciousness (its sudden appearance in time, periodic in-
terruptions and resumptions because of sleep or injury, its con-
comitance to experience) to demonstrate that consciousness has 
the aspect of a nature. Lonergan, in a similar vein but with dif-
ferent language, notes that the constituting impetus of the subject 
is dependent on non-intellectual patterns of experience, including 
limitation or suffocation by a biological pattern. 
However, there is an important difference between the two 
authors. Millan-Puelles holds that intentional self-transcendence is 
a prior condition of subjectivity. 2 9 5 Lonergan holds that our in-
tentionality that heads toward self-transcendence is already subjec-
tivity. For Lonergan, the subject is the nature that is paradigmatic, 
and not vice-versa; instead of saying with Millan-Puelles that the 
subject is like reality (reiforme), he would perhaps be more inclin-
ed to say other natures are «subject-like,» that is, patterned after 
the subject. 
It is worthwhile noting that some differences between the two 
authors, although suggestive, are only terminological, while others 
are more basic. For instance, Millan-Puelles uses «subjectivity» as 
a synonym for the person, reserving «self-consciousness» to refer 
to the subjective pole of conscious acts (Lonergan's subject). This 
terminological difference can be reconciled for as long as Lonergan 
admits a substance that lies behind the subject. However, the sub-
ject progressively becomes for him the source of method and 
paradigm for all substances, the substance behind the subject in-
cluded; and there the differences with Millan-Puelles escalate. 2 9 6 
CONCLUSIONS 
The difficulty of the task undertaken, that of beginning a 
serious critical study of transcendental Thomism, prevents a tidy 
concluding summary. We have only scratched the surface of the 
effort required to fully evaluate the transcendental method, its 
possibilities for a Thomist thematization, or even Lonergan's at-
tempts in this regard. 
Nonetheless, a study cannot proceed without an understan-
ding of the material, and Lonergan's method depends on the 
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cognitive subject constituted by radical intending. We think that 
the reader by now has a good idea of what the «subject» of 
Lonergan is and the methodological implications it portends. 
1. The subject is the immediate acting principle of our con-
scious acts. As the principle of immediate presence it is not 
abstract, for it must be present for abstraction to occur. Neither 
is it a total view of man, for we are incapable of comple self-
knowledge even in reflection, not to mention in a direct act inten-
tionally directed at an object. 
As such, we feel Lonergan's subject should initially be con-
sidered simply as an investigative focus, the mere fact of whose 
employment is indifferent until the context of its use is specified. 
On this level, our concern has been one of clarification-the sub-
ject is not the soul, for it is known by its acts and not by its 
potencies and habits. Nor is it the individual substance of a ra-
tional nature we call person, for it is not a substance, and is held 
to be the paradigm of our knowledge of natures in the first place. 
The subject was broached implicitly by Lonergan in Ver-
bum, where he attended preferentially to the epistemological 
aspects of wisdom whose founding principle and object were in-
tellectual light. But it is only explicitly adverted to in the inten-
tionality analysis of Insight, in the self-appropriation of the con-
scious subjectivity that appears concomitantly in the intentional 
acts of the subject in various clusters of progressive operations. 
These levels of operation, articulated according to Thomist 
rational psychology, serve as a powerful antidote to philosophical 
currents that segregate the subject in a mysterious not-to be-
touched domain of exaggerated intimacy. Without denying the 
fruitful discoveries made by certain phenomenologists and existen-
tialists in the areas of intersubjectivity and emotional experience, 
etc., Lonergan can insist that the subject possesses a structure, ir-
revisable in its essentials, which can be investigated and defended 
by an elenctic reductio ad absurdem that reveals the performative 
contradiction of an attempted denial of said structure. 2 9 7 
2. In our opinion, Lonergan's intentionality analysis should 
be seen as an adequate grounding of a method of interpretation. 
That is, it is a method of controlling meaning. It organizes the 
acts of meaning of the human subject. As such it could be useful 
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to develop a hermeneutic whose ultimate value-source is intellec-
tual light. 
Viewing intentionality analysis as a method of meaning 
helps to pinpoint its utility. As the matter studied by a science 
becomes increasingly dependent on acts of meaning, such as in the 
human sciences, intentionality analysis will become increasingly 
important and even indispensable. 
In sum, the utilization of an intentionality analysis is not 
peculiar solely to transcendental Thomists. Numerous Thomists 
have sought to incorporate in their speculation the immediacy and 
richness that it can provide. The question facing us is how inten-
tionality analysis and metaphysics are related. 
3. We have seen that Lonergan extends intentionality 
analysis into a transcendental search for its own conditions of 
possibility. 2 9 8 He wants to erect it as a self-justifying ground of 
method in general, and of metaphysics in particular. 
Lonergan has many equivalent ways of saying this, each 
with its own nuance: the theoretical and common-sense differen-
tiations of consciousness find their mutual coherence in a third, 
critical differentiation of consciousness; the grounding an-
thropological principle is the subject and not the soul; a generaliz-
ed method replaces logic since it can account for non-logical 
operations as well; method is adjusted to incorporate the historici-
ty of man as an essential element. In these and other instances, 
Lonergan is making a similar point. One begins with intentionali-
ty analysis. A metaphysical approach is acceptable within the 
theoretical differentiation of consciousness, but the critical ex-
igence is methodologically determining and favors a more fun-
damental preparation of metaphysics in intentionality analysis. 2 9 9 
A noteworthy result of this switch is the reliance on an-
ticipation in cognitional theory and metaphysics. A subject struc-
tured by human perplexity taken as a notion of being flows into 
a metaphysics that applies the relations that heuristically define 
the as yet unknown contents of cognitional acts to the structure 
of the universe of being proportional to the human mind. Within 
this approach, the mediating role that the a philosophy of nature 
traditionally played between metaphysics and the positive sciences 
simply vanishes between a transcendental metaphysics that offers 
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us the ontological structure, and the very positive sciences 
themselves, who offer all formal intelligible content. 
It is with this attempt to ground metaphysics in intentionali-
ty analysis that Lonergan parts company with Aquinas and with, 
we think, any adequate perspective of the possibilities held by the 
subject for method. A comparison with Millan-Puelles will be in-
structive, since the two authors share many common themes. 3 0 0 
The notable difference is that Millan Puelles focuses on in-
tentional transcendence of the subject as accomplished and not as 
anticipated. For this reason, the grasp of the being of an ex-
tramental object is a condition of possibility for intentional 
transcendence, and thus the objective world of nature is a 
paradigm of the subject, and a metaphysical analysis is made of 
knowledge. Since Lonergan focuses on intentional transcendence as 
anticipated, intentionality is the condition of possibility of an ob-
ject, the structure of the subject is the paradigm of the structure 
of beings in the objective world, and metaphysics receives its 
structure from an analogy with knowing. 
Depending on whether intentionality is considered apt for in-
corporation in a method as anticipating knowledge (Lonergan) or 
as accomplishing it (Millan Puelles), the direction of the grounding 
grounding relation between the two proceedings is fixed. A 
metaphysical foundation of intentionality treats the presence of the 
intentional content as an effect whose cause must be sought. An 
intentionality analysis that grounds metaphysics treats the intentional 
content as a presence prior to cause and effect. Clearly, then, the 
decisive disjunction that separates the two approaches —so similar 
and yet so different— is the approach that they have to being and 
the precise moment and nature of its intellection. 
4. Thus, we would claim, Lonergan's account of intellectual 
light or radical intending changes completely the moment he iden-
tifies it with the notion of being, and then uses this notion of be-
ing as a basis for elaborating a heuristic metaphysics. The insuffi-
ciently substantiated or weak points in Lonergan's theories either 
directly or indirectly relate to the intellection of being. 3 0 1 Let us 
look as some of the insufficiencies we detect. 
Lonergan's criticism of knowing as «taking a look» or intui-
tion is for the most part completely justified. At times, however, 
Lonergan casts the net of his epithets rather broadly. Whatever 
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realism that does not subscribe to the transcendentalist basic posi-
t ion is crypto-Scotist , empiricist , pragmatist intui t ionism. 
Lonergan's criticism is incomplete because it treats an intuition, 
an abstraction, and an apprehension of being as if there were no 
distinction between them. Since an apprehension of ens that is not 
an intuition nor an abstraction was proposed contemporaneously 
to Lonergan's critiques (e.g. by Fabro), his attacks seem to be im-
precise and outdated from the first moment, although effective in 
their proper place. 3 0 2 
Going directly to the heart of the matter, the identification 
of our intellectual dynamism with the notion of being is too has-
ty in Insight. It is not that Lonergan does not discuss it, but 
because his solution to the critical problem and his metaphysics 
both rise or fall upon it, we feel that he could have mounted a 
more vigorous defense of his position. For instance, he does not 
rebut the critique that his heuristic being is really only potential 
or habitual knowledge of being, or that this being is only the for-
mal object of our knowing, but not its adequate formal object. 
The attainment of metaphysical elements through a deduc-
tion from the isomorphism of the structures of knowing and the 
known also has a relation to the intellection of being. Isomor-
phism itself is immanent; it relates the structures of acts and their 
contents. It is incapable of grounding a metaphysical statement 
unless these contents are something more than contents; this 
seems to have been the problem that bedeviled Husserl. Lonergan 
has avoided the problem since both the acts and their contents are 
instigated and integrated by an intention of being, therefore the 
contents have existential reference. However, if Lonergan's iden-
tification of intellectual dynamism with a notion of being is 
suspect, so are his metaphysical elements. 
The transcendental method only serves as a basis of 
metaphysics if one considers knowing itself as an interpretation, 
since it controls the acts of meaning that enter into our 
knowledge of beings. Inasmuch as apprehended being has a con-
tent that is received or apprehended, it will introduce a cogni-
tional act that is not an act of meaning. Metaphysics would not 
be an method of interpretation, and Lonergan's insistence of the 
priority of intentionality analysis over metaphysics would simply 
be an error. 
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5. We will close our study at this point with a an observa-
tion that shall have to be left undocumented. In our opinion, a 
judicious evaluation of the transcendental brand of Thomism 
should attend preferentially to thinkers such as Lonergan, in 
whom the question is simply whether a legitimate critical exigence 
exists and should be incorporated methodologically In general, 
more attention has been paid to authors who define man as essen-
tially an obediential potency for a possible Divine Revelation, 
thus inserting another transcendence, toward the Absolute Being, 
as the ground of both ontology and gnoseology. At times this 
theological anthropology, is identified wi th transcendental 
Thomism in its entirety. This attention, in our opinion, obeys 
pastoral considerations of theology rather than the speculative 
demands of philosophy, and in the long run only serves to con-
fuse and sidetrack a fruitful dialogue about method. 
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supra., for the respective types of self knowledge. 
127. A Q U I N A S , S. Th., I, 87, 1 c ; he makes the same point in S.Th., I, 111 , 1 
ad 3m. 
128. See Perego, «Nuova opinione*, p. 419. 
129. L O N E R G A N , «Christ as a Subject*, Collection, p. 183. 
130. See ibid., p. 185. LONERGAN appeals in this point to Van Riet, «Idealisme 
et Christianisme*, Revue philosophique de Louvain, 56 (1958) 403 f. St. 
Thomas finds no difficulty in the potential infinity of the intellect implied 
by the indefinite number of reflexive intentions possible in this position. 
See S. Th.; I; 87, 3 ad 3m and 86, 2 c. 
131. LONERGAN, «Christ as Subject,* Collection, p. 178. 
132. Ibid. 
133. Ibid.. 
134. Method in Theology, p. 25. 
135. See Insight, pp. 348 f. 
136. In any event, LONERGAN on a few occasions uses the technical term, in-
tention of being, as a synonym for notion of being (e.g. Insight, p. 355, 
p. 359), which we feel is preferable to desire or notion precisely for 
avoiding the connotations that LONERGAN finds necessary to clarify. 
137. See Insight, p. 351, Understanding and Being, pp. 178-92. 
138. LONERGAN tries to show that the various theoretical accounts of the no-
tion of being of Parmenides, Plato, Aristotle, Cajetan, Aquinas, and Hegel 
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succeed to the extent that they suppose his notion of being and fail to the 
extent that they ignore it. See Insight, pp. 360-383. 
139. For a discussion of heuristic procedures, see Section H.III.C.l of the thesis. 
140. Insight, p. 348. 
141. Ibid., p. 349. In Verbum, LONERGAN had called the final object of the in-
tellect being, but it was not yet clear that this was how being was to be 
defined. 
142. LONERGAN, «Metaphysics as Horizon,» Collection, pp. 215 f. This is 
perhaps the fundamental point regarding Lonergan's notion of being. The 
notion of being is intellectual light, and as intellectual light it enters into 
our consciousness before knowing is an accomplished fact, at the inten-
tional stage of wonder. It is incorrect to think of ens as extrinsic to in-
tellectual light, for intellectual light is the notion of ens prior to the con-
ceptualization of ens and the affirmation of individual beings. For this 
reason, LONERGAN does not think that the indétermination of his notion 
of ens consigns it to the «nothing» to which rationalist and essentialist ap-
proaches to being eventually led. 
143. LONERGAN bats down various objections to the all-inclusiveness of the ob-
jective of knowing; see Insight, pp. 351 f., Understanding and Being, pp.181 
f. Basically he is explaining the intellect as «potens omnia facere et fieri». 
144. Understanding and Being, p. 183. 
145. Insight, p. 369. 
146. See Insight, pp. 644-51. 
147. Insight, p. 368; cfr. A. Marc, «L'Idée de l'être chez saint Thomas et dans 
la scolastique postérieure,» Arch, de Phil, 10 (1933) 31-49. 
148. Fabro, criticizing Maritain, notes: «...l'ews... non è pertanto la simplex ap-
prehensio dell'essenza confusa alla quale risponda l'affermazione dell'esse nel 
giudizio, che in tal caso sarebbe un giudizio formale di contenuto di essen-
za e non di presenza di realtà. («Problematica», p. 195). 
149. See Understanding and Being, pp. 204 ff., 259 f. 
150. See Sec. ÏÏ.III.A.4. of the thesis. 
151. LONERGAN does not exclude a metaphysical approach. One can begin 
with the metaphysics of the object, proceed to the metaphysical structure 
of the knower and to the metaphysics of knowing, and complement the 
metaphysics of knowing with psychological determinations taken from con-
sciousness. Or one can, as LONERGAN does in Insight, begin from cogni-
tional process, formulate a notion of objectivity entirely on that process, 
and only later proceed to a metaphysics of the knower and the object in 
terms of metaphysical terms of being, potency, form and act. «In principle, 
it makes no difference where one chooses to start. What is important is 
going around the circle.» (Understanding and Being, pp. 220 f.). 
152. Note the contrast between this position and those in which the difference 
among individual beings (the multiplicity of ens) is given within the very 
intellection of being. 
153. Insight, p. 378. 
154. Cfr. n.m.D.2. of the thesis. 
155. See Insight, p. 375. 
156. See ibid., p. 376. 
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157. Ibid.. 
158. Insight, p. 377. 
159. The Greek antikeimenon («lies opposite®) and the Latin obiectum («put, set, 
or lie opposite®) both connote something sensibly and spatially related to 
a spectator or sensitive subject. 
160. The empirical Kantian Anschauung is said to be the one means by which 
our cognitional operations are related immediately to objects. See KANT, 
KrV, A 19, B 33; see also LONERGAN, «Metaphysics as Horizon,® Collec-
tion, p. 208. 
161. LONERGAN, «Cognitional Structure,® Collection, p. 228. 
162. Ibid., p. 229. 
163. «...all objectivity rests upon the unrestricted, detached, disinterested desire 
to know. It is that desire that sets up the canons of normative objectivity. 
It is that desire that gives rise to the absolute objectivity implicit in judg-
ment. It is that desire that yields the constellation of judgments that im-
plicitly define the principal notion of distinct objects in the universe of be-
ing, some of which know others. Experiential objectivity has to rest on the 
same basis...® (Insight, p. 383). 
164. Cfr. the discussion in the thesis regarding «body», and the difference bet-
ween fact and data in Sections II.ILC.3. and II.rV.B., respectively. 
165. Even Kant's Verstand or understanding has only mediate object of a 
knowledge in comparison to sensitive intuition (KrV, A 68 = B 93) and 
the Vemunft (reason) is doubly mediated (KrV, A 643 = B 671). This is 
why LONERGAN can muse: «If it is merely confusion of thought that in-
terprets objectivity in terms of extroversion [he thinks it is], Kant's Coper-
nican revolution was a half-hearted affair [he thinks it was].® (Insight, p. 
413). 
166. Data may be more significant in one department of knowledge or another, 
but not more valid as data. 
167. Insight, p. 383. 
168. See ibid., p. 380. 
169. See ibid., p. 381. 
170. The virtually unconditioned is the agent object of the inner word of judg-
ment, it is the assessment that the evidence is sufficient to rationally affirm 
the proposed judgment. See section II. IV.D.2. of the thesis. 
171. LONERGAN, «Cognitional Structure,® Collection, p. 230. Note that, 
although the subject transcends itself in the absolute objectivity of the judg-
ment, since the being to which it transcends is being as a totality, a prin-
cipal notion of objectivity is still necessary to discover the existence of sub-
ject and object within that being. 
172. See the development in section II.V.D. of the thesis. 
173. Insight, p. 384. 
174. E.g. with relativists (pp. 343-48, ibid), with Kantian transcendentalism (pp. 
339-42), with Hegel (pp. 372-74, 421-423), Descartes (pp. 408-411), and em-
piricism (pp. 411-16). 
175. See Insight, p. 388. 
176. Emerich CORETH, «Dialectic of Performance and Concept,® Spirit as In-
quiry, ed. F. Crowe, St. Xavier College Press, Chicago, 1964, p. 153 and 
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passim; see also Metaphysik, pp. 68-79. LONERGAN accepts this terminology 
in his «Metaphysics as Horizon» (Collection, pp. 219 1) with the caveat that 
Coreth takes metaphysics as the total and basic horizon, thus identifying 
the transcendental and metaphysical methods. LONERGAN feels that this 
proceeding leaves the subject as an uncriticized abstraction from the incar-
nate inquiring subject and leaves the historical, social, and personal origins 
of counter-positions unexplained. L O N E R G A N dissects the sources of 
counter-positions in Insight from both a theoretical (pp. 181-244) and 
historical (pp. 364-74; 401-430) viewpoint. 
For LONERGAN, metaphysics is the «objective pole» of a total horizon in 
which the method of performing can reveal a «subjective pole.» Thus Cor-
eth lacks an additional step in his dialectic that would show metaphysics 
itself to be formally dependent on cognitional theory or transcendental an-
thropology. For this reason LONERGAN calls for a «fuller sweep in the 
alternations of his [Coreth's] dialectic of Vollzug und Begriff» (op. cit., p. 
220). 
177. Hence Lonergan's discussions of being and objectivity are not really apart 
from his cognitional theory. 
178. See Insight, p. 391. 
179. See ibid., pp. 432-37. 
180. See ibid., pp. 437-79. 
181. Insight, p. 521. 
182. See ibid., pp. 564-94. 
183. Insight, p. 731. The possibilities of the transcendental method for the 
posterior fides quaerens intellectum are reserved for Method in Theology, but 
the other elements of this subjectivity-based theoretcial expansion are en-
countered even within Insight. 
184. See ibid., pp. 607-615. 
185. See ibid., pp. 669-77. 
186. See ibid. pp. 693-723. Although LONERGAN doesn't say it, the develop-
ment describes this plan as known and practiced by the Catholic Church. 
187. In the thesis, this section also permits us to later detect the emergence of 
his transcendental approach within his interpretation of authors whose 
method is nonetheless classically metaphysical. 
188. We shall prescind in the present study from the significant dissimilarities 
that Lonergan's approach to the structuring principle of the subject 
possesses with respect to the active principle of other transcendental 
Thomists. Some indications along this line are given in sections II.I.C.4-6 
of the thesis. 
189. See Verbum, p. viii. See also Aristotle, De Anima, II, 1, 412b 4 ff.; 
A Q U I N A S , In II De Anima, lect. 6, §§ 305-08. 
190. See A R I S T O T L E , De Anima, II, 4, 415a 14-20. 
191. See Ibid. II, 4, 415b 28 ff. 
192. See Ibid. II, 5-12; III, 1 ff. 
193. See Ibid, in, 4-7. 
194. LONERGAN, Verbum, p. ix. 
195. LONERGAN, «The Subject», Second Collection, pp. 72 f. 
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196. Ibid., p. 73. We assume that the change in terminology from «act» to 
«operation» wishes to use the more precise term «operation» to refer to 
what Aristotle would call «second act», and avoid the more general term 
«act» which could include the «first act» of the soul, which LONERGAN 
wishes to exclude. 
197. E. GiLSON, The Spirit of Medieval Philosophy, New Y o r k , Charles 
Scribner's Sons, 1940, pp. 168-208. 
198. See Ibid., pp. 191 f. 
199. See Ibid., pp. 193-200. 
200. See Ibid., p. 195. This would amount to likening man to the angels; cfr. 
A Q U I N A S , S. Th., I, 50, 4. 
201. See AQUINAS, S. Th., I, 47, 2 c. 
202. GiLSON, ...Medieval Philosophy, pp. 198 f. 
203. «...Anima illud esse in quo subsistit communicat materiae corporali, ex qua 
et anima intellectiva fit unum, ita quod illud esse quod est totius compositi, 
est etiam ipsius animae, quod non accidit in aliis formis, quae non sunt 
subsistentes: et propter hoc anima humana remanet in suo esse, destructo 
corpore, non autem aliae formae.» (AQUINAS, S. Th., I, 76, 1 ad 5). 
204. See GiLSON, ...Medieval Philosophy, p. 177. 
205. «Everything seems to point to the conclusion that in his [Aristotle's] 
thought, the man is indeed no more than the union of his soul with the 
body of which it is the form, and that this intellect he speaks of is another 
intellectual substance, in contact and communication with our soul, 
separate from our body by the very fact that it does not enter into the 
composition of our concrete individuality, immortal in consequence, but 
with an immortality which is its own, and is not ours,» (Ibid., pp. 179 f.); 
see Aristotle, De Anima, I, 2; and De Gener. Anim., 736b, 28). 
206. See GiLSON, ...Medieval Philosophy, pp. 187 f. 
207. See Ibid., 198 ff. 
208. Ibid, p. 184. 
209. «Substantiae vero incorruptibiles manent semper non solum secundum 
speciem, sed etiam secundum individua: et ideo etiam ipsa individua sunt 
de principali intentione naturae.» (AQUINAS, S. Th., I, 98, 1 c). 
210. «...individua substantia rationalis naturae...* (Boetius, De Duabus Naturis et 
Una Persona Christi, c. 3; in Migne P L , 64, col. 1345). 
211 . GiLSON, ...Medieval Philosophy, p. 203. 
212. See Ibid., p. 204. 
213. «...almost all that we know of the philosophy of personality is found in 
the medieval thinkers in the questions they devote to the Trinity... 
It is in Boetius' De Duabus Naturis...that occurs that definition of the per-
son...It was in order to know whether they had the right to apply it to 
God that St. Bonaventure and St. Thomas examined and explored the 
definition of Boetius.» (Ibid.). 
214. Ibid.. 
215. This influence can be found, as GiLSON undertakes to show, in such areas 
as the acquisition of scientific knowledge of things, knowledge of practical 
arts, and knowledge of self, knowledge of the virtues necessary for the 
achievement of the moral life. See ibid., pp. 209-363. 
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216. For this reason, to extract the world of human interiority LONERGAN 
turns to St. Thomas's writing on the Trinity: «...St. Thomas's thought on 
verbum occurs, for the most part, in a trinitarian context. If Thomist 
philosophers...are reluctant to venture into this field, it remains that a 
historian must do so.» (Verbum, p. xiv). 
217. E.g., «...I should say that the discovery of the subject, attributed to Ger-
man idealism and subsequent philosophies, was simply an unbalanced effort 
to restore what implicitly existed in...St. Thomas but had been submerged 
by the conceptualist tendency...* (LONERGAN, «Christ as Subject*, Collec-
tion, p. 192). 
218. Since both authors hold that Aquinas was the apex of medieval specula-
tion, we shall henceforth speak in terms of his thought instead of medieval 
thought in general. 
219. LONERGAN, «Christ as Subject*, Collection, p. 174. 
220. See Verbum, p. x, also p. xiii where LONERGAN contends that it was 
precisely AQUINAS who was aware of these distinctions, even if he did 
not leave behind reflections on them, or draw out the methodological im-
plications they contain. 
221. LONERGAN, «The Subject*, Second Collection, pp. 73 ff. 
222. Thus his paradoxical conclusion that neglect or truncation of the subject 
leads to idealism. See ibid., pp. 75-79. 
223. See Ibid., p. 79. 
224. Ibid., p. 86. LONERGAN considers most brands of phenomenology and ex-
istentialistic philosophy to have fallen in this trap. 
225. If one wants to admit that the two approaches are complementary (e.g. 
Millán Puelles, ...subjetividad, p. 315) the issue can perhaps be pushed to 
another level: which approach grounds the other? Is an intentionality 
analysis a material preparation for metaphysics or does it formally ground 
it? Does the intentionality analysis in this role involve all cognitional acts 
or only some?. 
226. LONERGAN, «Existenz and Aggiornamento», Collection, pp. 241. 
227. LONERGAN, «Christ as Subject», Collection, p. 196. 
228. LONERGAN, «Existenz and Aggiornamento», Collection, pp. 241. 
229. LONERGAN, «Christ as Subject», Collection, p. 196. Principium quod or 
principle-whicb is in contrast to principium quo, or principle-by-which. 
230. Ibid., p. 174. 
231. Ibid., p. 196. Here the subiectum actu is the subject as a principle of con-
scious acts of sensation or intelligence. 
232. LONERGAN, Insight, p. 328. It is clear from the various contexts, e.g. p. 
325, that LONERGAN is using T and 'subject' interchangeably. The 
substitution of T for 'subject' in Insight serves a rhetorical purpose, as it 
provides one of the elements in Lonergan's self-affirmation «I am a 
knower». Note the appositive use of the two terms in «Christ as Subject», 
op.cit., p. 168: «But insofar as «I» or the psychological subject,...». Also see 
pp. 169, 170, 172, 177 f., of same article for similar instances of inter-
changeable usage. 
233. See in this regard the heavy criticism (Second Collection, p. 11-32) that 
LONERGAN heaps upon Leslie Dewart's proposal (The Future of Belief, 
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New York, 1966) to «dehellenize dogma» by eliminating such terms as 
«nature». It is also noteworthy that John Finnis at times uses Lonergan's 
theory of the subject and its associated terminology in order to insist that 
our free acts and choices reveal the person. This forms part of his struggle 
against consequentialist ethical theories which cast into doubt the 
knowability of the subject and minimize the effect of self-determination of 
the subject by its own acts in the moral evaluation of an action, letting 
the evaluative weight fall upon the results foreseen by the action. (See Fin-
nis, «The Act of the Person», Persona, Verità e Morale-Atti del Congresso 
di Teologia Morale, Città Nuova Editrice, Roma, 1987, pp. 160-62.). 
234. LONERGAN, «The Future of Thomism», Second Collection, p. 51. 
235. LONERGAN, «Christ as Subject*, Collection, pp. 176 f. 
236. MULAN-PUFLLES, «...Subjetividad, pp. 91-103. 
237. He calls this aspect of the subject subjetividad reiforme (subject-as-thing). 
See ibid., pp. 103-112. 
238. See ibid., p. 128. Note that if it receives determinations independently of 
conscious acts, it can be inferred that it exists independently of conscious 
acts. 
239. MlLLÁN-PuELLES, «Subjetividad», p. 95. Translation ours. 
240. Ibid., p. 136. Emphasis and translation ours. 
241. The fact that an accident could change without changing the person could 
be adduced as evidence that the person does not include in its meaning the 
totality of being. While a person does in fact remain the same person even 
throughout many accidental changes, nonetheless the person is the ultimate 
term of predication. Thus while Fred does not change into Barney because 
he goes bald, when Fred is referred to as a person, the entire Fred is 
meant, including the hair that may be on his head. 
242. LONERGAN, «Existenz and Aggiornamento», Collection, p. 241. Emphasis 
ours. These pairs seem to emphasize different types of consciousness-
empirical, intelligent, rational, and moral. 
243. «It [being oneself] is substance and subject: our opaque being that rises to 
consciousness and our conscious being by which we save or damn our 
souls.» (LONERGAN, «Existenz and Aggiornamento», Collection, p. 248). 
244. LONERGAN, «Cognitional Structure,* Collection, p. 222. 
245. Ibid.. 
246. It is a sine qua non for the occurrence of insight as described in Chapter 
1; it grounds the methods of the sciences described in Chapters 2-6, in-
cluding human sciences (Chapter 15, 17) and even metaphysics (Chapter 
15). It is normative of cognitional structure (Chapter 9-10), the object of 
self-affirmation in Chapter 11, and fundamental to Lonergan's notions of 
being and objectivity (Chapters 12 and 13). Transcendental knowledge is 
broached by a refusal to place limits on this principle (Chapter 19). That 
this principle is the dynamic ground of ethical principles is hinted at in 
Chapter 18, but only fully clear in post-Insight works. 
Therefore, to attempt a comprehensive evaluation of Lonergan's cognitional 
theory attending solely to the existence and ordering of the levels of 
cognitive subjectivity, while ignoring their constitution, is somewhat 
frivolous. This is precisely what Marc Smith does in an article [«Is There 
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a Thomist Alternative to Lonergan's Cognitional Structure?,* Thomist, 43 
(1979) 626-36] that claims to vindicate Lonergan's cognitional theory 
without discussing its dynamic principle. 
247. Insight, p. 9. 
248. Sala, «A-priori,» p. 220. 
249. He calls agent intellect at times the «active principle of understanding,* cfr. 
Verbum, p. 83. 
250. AQUINAS divides the acts of the will into desire, love, and delight, cfr. C. 
Gent., m, 26, § 2071. 
251. See Insight, pp. 354 f. 
252. «All men by nature desire to know.* (980a 22). 
253. «Nam primo et per se intellectus movet voluntatem... voluntas enim, in-
quantum huiusmodi, movetur a suo obiecto, quod est bonum apprehensum. 
Voluntas autem movet intellectum quasi per accidens, inquantum scilicet in-
telligere ipsum apprehenditur ut bonum...» (C. Gent., HI, 26, § 2092). 
254. «Et in hoc ipso intellectus voluntatem praecedit: nunquam enim voluntas 
desideraret intelligere nisi prius intellectus ipsum intelligere apprehenderet 
ut bonum.» (Ibid.). 
One could also observe, since understanding is always understanding something, 
that the before the act of understanding is itself understood, something else is 
understood, such that at least two acts of understanding precede the will's desire 
to understand. 
255. Insight, p. 355. 
256. See Insight, pp. 598-600. Also, the interference with the unfolding of the 
desire to know that LONERGAN labels as «obscurantism» (pp. 636-39) is 
clearly voluntary. 
257. «...voluntas movet intellectum ad operandum in actu per modum quo agens 
movere dicitur; intellectus autem voluntatem per modum quo finis movet, 
nam bonum intellectum est finis voluntatis; agens autem est posterior in 
movendo quam finis, nam agens non movet nisi propter finem.» (C. Gent., 
HI, 26, § 2092). 
258. See ARISTOTLE, De Anima, III, 5, 430a 10-17. 
259. This involves abstraction. See AQUINAS, In III de An., lect. 10, §§ 730 f. 
260. See AQUINAS, C. Gent, II, 77, % 1584. 
261 : See ARISTOTLE, De Anima, III, 5, 430a 13-15. 
262. «Unde nihil prohibet ipsi lumini nostrae animae attribuere actionem in-
tellectus agentis: et praecipue cum Aristoteles intellectum agentem comparet 
lumini.» (C. Gent., II, 77, § 1584). 
263. «...homo enim abstrahit a phantasmatibus, et recipit mente intelligibilia in 
actu; non enim aliter in notitiam harum actionum venissemus nisi eas in 
nobis experiremur. Oportet igitur quod principia quibus attribuuntur hae 
actiones, scilicet intellectus possibilis et agens, sint virtutes quaedam in 
nobis formaliter existentes.» (Ibid., 76, § 1577). 
264. «...dicendum quod anima humana intelligit seipsam per suum intelligere, 
quod est actus proprius eius, perfecte demonstrans virtute eius et naturam.» 
(AQUINAS, S. Ib., I, 88, 2, ad 3m), emphasis ours. 
265. Insight, p. 370. 
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266. See ibid. p. 89. See also A Q U I N A S , In I Sent, 3, 4, 5 sol.; In Boet. de Trin., 
Prooem., 1, 3, ad lm. 
267. See Insight, p. 181-89. That is to say, although the light of our intellects 
is known per se ipsum it can be overlooked; similarly, although the desire 
to know is natural to us, the intellectual pattern of experience is not 
perpetual or even dominant. 
268. See ibid. p. 80. See also A Q U I N A S , In Boet. de Trin., lect. I, 1, 1, ad 4m; 
C. Gent., Ill, 46, § 2230. 
269. See Verbum, p. 83. 
270. Ibid., p. 81. Compare A Q U I N A S , In Boet. de Trin., Prooem., 1, 3 c: «...lux 
naturalis per quam constituitur vis intellectiva...». 
271. «By the desire to know is meant the dynamic orientation manifested in 
questions for intelligence and for reflection. It is not the verbal utterance 
of questions. It is not the conceptual formulation of questions. It is not 
any insight or thought. It is not any reflective grasp or judgment. It is the 
prior and enveloping drive that carries cognitional process from sense and 
imagination to understanding, from understanding to judgment, from judg-
ment to the complete context of correct judgments that is named 
knowledge. The desire to know, then, is simply the inquiring and critical 
spirit of man.» (Insight, p. 348). 
272. Ibid., p. 89. 
273. See Verbum, pp. 84 f., also A Q U I N A S , De Vet., 1, 9 c. 
274. See Insight, pp. 348-52. 
275. Man's normal questioning grounds the immanent exigence for sufficient 
evidence before judging (Insight, p. 284, 395), and refusal to arbitrarily stifle 
this questioning marks the opening to knowledge that is transcendent in 
the strict sense (Ibid., pp. 635 f., 688). 
276. There he wants to show that A Q U I N A S , adapting Aristotelian texts, replac-
ed the Augustinian vision of eternal truths with intellectual light as the 
ground of judgment. The reference to light helps LONERGAN to make his 
point since it serves as a thread between his historical sources. See Verbum, 
pp. 83 f., 184-189. 
277. Recall that L O N E R G A N cannot have recourse to the conclusions of natural 
theology as St. Thomas does to ground various elements of cognitional 
theory, since he has proposed anthropology as a methodologically prior 
discipline. 
278. See Sections II.I.C.4-6 of the thesis regarding the natural desire to know 
God, the anonymous Christian, and the anonymous metaphysician. 
279. See Method in Theology, p. 25. 
280. See O. M U C K , The Transcendental Method, Herder & Herder, New York, 
1968, pp. 186 ff. 
281. See Insight, Chapter 19. 
282. This terminology is ours, but corresponds to the difference L O N E R G A N 
sees between explicit and latent metaphysics (Insight, p. 391). 
283. Understanding and Being, pp. 196 ff. 
284. L O N E R G A N , «Natural Knowledge of God,» Second Collection, p. 123. 
285. L O N E R G A N , «The Subject,* Second Collection, p. 81. L O N E R G A N often 
substitutes the intelligible for the unum (e.g., Method in Theology, pp. 11 f.) 
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for this reason he says «approximately.» The change is significant, for 
although what is intelligible is the unum, by connotation unum is referred 
to existents, and intelligible by connotation is referred to our cognitive 
faculties, i.e. the existent as intentionally known by us. In the traditional 
theory of the transcendentals only the verum held a reference to the 
cognitive faculties of man, in LONERGAN unum, ens and verum all have 
such a reference, and for him this reference is the basis of the convertibili-
ty of their predication. 
286. W. F. R Y A N and Bernard J . TYRELL, «Introduction,» Second Collection, p. 
viii. 
287. L O N E R G A N , «Insight Revisited,» Second Collection, p. 277. 
288. L O N E R G A N , «The Subject,» Second Collection, p. 81. The full integration of 
the fourth level in the thought of L O N E R G A N is apparent in Method in 
Theology, pp. 8-25, passim. 
289. For instance, in Verbum (pp. 165 f.), L O N E R G A N admits that the impress-
ed species (considered as the immaterial similitude of the form of the 
known thing) is the work of the agent intellect and received in the possi-
ble intellect; both are unconscious precursors of conscious types of abstrac-
t ion that fo l low. This is an aspect of these potencies k n o w n by 
metaphysical conclusion, and not in what LONERGAN will in later works 
call the subject. 
290. See AQUINAS, De Anima, 5, ad l m & ad 4m. 
291. This is particularly important since many criticisms of transcendental 
Thomism in general take aim at the error of making the agent intellect a 
«case of knowledge* rather than a «condition of knowledge.* (See J . 
K N A S A S , «Transcendental Thomism and the Thomistic Texts,* p. 89-92). 
This type of criticism is aimed at Maréchal, whose notion of the a-priori 
is closer to Kant's than Lonergan's is; on the above showing, it cannot be 
applied, at least without further refinement, to L O N E R G A N . Reichmann 
bases a more profound critique on the the objection that the performance 
of the agent intellect does not prov ide sufficient ground for the 
unrestricted, transcendental hor izon claimed by Core th and other 
transcendental Thomists. This criticism is germane to Lonergan's thought 
as well, but the application is less obvious if one does not clearly 
distinguish the agent intellect from Lonergan's subject. [See J . Reichmann, 
«...Psychogenesis of Being,* Thomist, 32 (1968) pp. 475-83; also Sec II.V.C, 
of the thesis.]. 
292. See L O N E R G A N , Understanding and Being, pp. 169 f.; LONERGAN accepts 
Kant's transcendental ego, although changing the details of its structure, 
and most importantly, insisting that it and its structure is experienced, and 
does not need to be known as a conclusion of an investigation (See Method 
in Theology, pp. 13 f., 15 f.). 
293. See K. RAHNER, «Sobre el concepto teológico de concupiscencia,» Escritos 
de teología I, Taurus, Madrid, 1961, pp. 381-419. Rahner's «person» is con-
stituted by an urge toward the supernatural (see C. F A B R O , Svolta, pp. 223 
f., 239-48); this, as we have indicated, is consistently eschewed by 
LONERGAN in favor of a purely natural desire toward natural transcendent 
objectives. 
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294. See Lonergan's mild criticism in this regard in «Metaphysics as Horizon,* 
Collection, p. 219 f. 
295. MlLLÁN-PuELLES, ...Subjetividad, pp. 162-66. 
296. Both the reconcilable terminological difference and the incompatible 
methodological difference between the two authors can be culled from an 
observation of Millán-Puelles: «...la subjetividad es necesariamente perceptiva 
del mundo, en la medida en que efectivamente ejerce la conciencia, pero 
ni más ni menos que en esta misma medida. La aclaración resulta conve-
niente. Su servicio consiste en subrayar que la subjetividad no es 
meramente el polo funcional de la conciencia en acto, sino el sustrato que 
parcialmente se aparece en esta clase de actos y que, por tanto, en vez de 
consistir en un sujeto que necesita de ellos, es el sujeto del cual ellos 
necesitan.» (Ibid., p. 136). 
297. For this reason, it is not surprising that moralists such as John Finnis 
recur to Lonergan's theory of the subject LONERGAN to combat conse-
quentialists who deny the knowability of the subject. LONERGAN has the 
merit of accounting for such erroneous positions. If knowledge is based on 
the analogy of the confrontation of seer and seen in ocular vision, it is not 
surprising that self-knowledge as an interior look becomes so difficult. If, 
however, LONERGAN is correct in denying that knowledge is «taking a 
look», but is rather essentially identity of knower and known, then a par-
tial and fruitful self-knowledge is possible through such activities as in-
quiry, understanding, weighing evidence and judging, none of which are 
analogous to seeing. See Finnis, «The Act of the Human Person,» in Per-
sona, Verità e Morale, pp. 160-162. 
298. He takes his cue in this from AQUINAS, De Ver., 1, 9 c. This has been 
explained in Section II.V.A of the thesis and demonstrated in Sections B, 
C, and D of the same chapter. 
299. If one adverts to the contrast of metaphysical and critical-intentional pro-
cedures in Fig. 11, one will note that in the metaphysical sequence, acts 
are immediately related to objects (by causality) and habits (by causality). 
Thus one would expect that the speculative entrance by a Thomist into 
the study of the subject could take place on the one hand by assuming the 
relation of habit and act within the act as an aspect of the act itself or 
by substituting the extrinsic causal relation of object and act with an in-
trinsic intentionality of the act. The former route was discussed as 
Lonergan's epistemological wisdom in Section I.I.B.5 of the thesis, the lat-
ter gradually showed itself to be the more prominent route in Lonergan's 
later works, and has been emphasized in the later chapters of the thesis 
and the present study. 
300. The concomitant nature of the appearance of the subject in consciousness, 
the concern for the structure of subjectivity, intentionality, the successive 
notions of being that arise in cognitional process. 
301. The attitude LONERGAN takes toward the intellection of being seems to 
be related to his approach to experience or perception. Both LONERGAN 
and other Thomists hold that the perception is an act with contributions 
from both sense and intellect. However, LONERGAN resolves these con-
tributions in a dualism of two types of knowing, while Fabro and others 
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concentrate on showing how they combine in the cogitativa. It is precisely 
in this combination, according to them, that the original apprehension of 
being occurs. For LONERGAN, the cogitativa takes on a lesser role of an 
assistant to the imagination that may or may not be essential to the grasp 
of insight into phantasm. In this reduced role, it cannot support the 
demands of connecting our sense and intellectual knowledge that other 
Thomists place upon it, much less the apprehension of being. See Chapter 
II.II. of the thesis. . 
302. In this regard we would suggest that Fabro's distancing of his position 
from that of such philosophers such as Maritain, with whom he is com-
monly associated, should be taken more seriously. (See «Problematica», p. 
195) Lonergan's attack on traditional neo-scholastic approaches to being 
doesn't account for Fabro's position, but could very well rebut that of 
Maritain and Gilson. Thus, Lonergan's work could push neo-Thomist 
philosophers to a greater precision. 
